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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 
International commercial arbitration can be described as a means by which international 
business disputes are, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, definitively resolved by 
independent, non-governmental, decision-makers selected by or for the parties, applying 
neutral judicial procedures that provide the parties an opportunity to be heard.
2
 Thus, by 
choosing arbitration as the means of settling a commercial dispute, the disputing parties 
agree to appoint a third party to conclusively decide their rights, duties and obligations in 
the dispute.
3
  
 
The disctinction between domestic and international arbitration is highlighted by the fact 
that some countries, such as France and Switzerland, have opted for specific rules for 
international arbitration disctinct from those governing domestic arbitration. However, the 
clear majority of European countries, including England and Finland, do not consider 
international arbitration as having a specific nature justifying different rules compared to 
those governing domestic arbitration. For the purposes of this thesis, by international 
arbitration is meant the settlement of a commercial dispute in which the parties, the 
arbitrators and the seat of the arbitration are not of the same nationality
4
. The term 
“arbitration” can be said to generally include four fundamental features, namely that it is i) 
an alternative to national court proceedings, ii) a private mechanism, iii) controlled and 
selected by the parties and iv) a final and binding determination of parties’ rights and 
obligations.
5
  
 
Business enterprises often find themselves parties to contracts with foreign companies 
from around the world, which by corollary may lead to being party to litigation before 
courts in distant locations. Due to the importance of forum selection, parties to cross-
                                                        
2
 Born 2009, pp. 64–65. 
3
 Luttrell 2009, p. 2. 
4
 It should be noted that the definition of ”international” arbitration varies from author to author. For a 
detailed examination on the differences between the objective and subjective criteria used in different 
countries to distinguish between domestic and international arbitration, see e.g. Poudret and Besson 2007, pp. 
30–37. For illustrative purposes, an example of a definition of ”international arbitration” can be found in 
article 1(3) of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law.  
5
 Lew, Mistelis, et al. 2003, p. 3. 
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border commercial transactions often include dispute resolution provisions in their 
agreements selecting a contractual forum in which to resolve their differences, normally 
taking the form of either i) a forum selection clause or ii) an arbitration agreement. 
International arbitration agreements, which can be entered into either before or after a 
dispute arises, provide a contractual choice of a dispute resolution forum. In practice, most 
international commercial arbitrations occur pursuant to arbitration clauses contained within 
underlying business contracts, which typically provide for the arbitration of future disputes 
relating to that contract.
6
  
 
The increasing popularity of arbitration as the preferred means of resolving international 
commercial disputes can be linked to the perception that international arbitration provides 
a neutral, speedy and expert dispute resolution process, which is largely subject to the 
parties’ control and leads to an internationally enforceable decision.7  Unlike orders of 
national courts, arbitral awards are portable by virtue of the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958 (hereinafter “the New 
York Convention”) which allows parties to transact across borders knowing that if a 
dispute arises, they will not have to press their substantive rights in the other party’s 
national courts to get a final result.
8
 
 
International arbitration is a fundamentally consensual means of dispute resolution and 
arbitrators derive their authority from the arbitration agreement. Consensual arbitration 
may be classified as institutional arbitration, ad hoc arbitration or a combination of both. 
Ad hoc arbitration is the original form of arbitration and remains today the basic form of 
arbitration. In ad hoc arbitration the parties administer the proceedings themselves from 
the beginning and may also decide on the procedural provisions in detail within the 
boundaries set by legislation. In institutional arbitration the parties agree to resort to the 
services of an existing arbitral institution which generally has a specific set of arbitral rules 
regulating inter alia the conduct of the arbitral proceedings.
9
 
 
Although party autonomy is the fundamental principle followed in international 
commercial arbitration, once a dispute has arisen it may be difficult for the disputing 
                                                        
6
 Born 2009, pp. 65–68. 
7
 Born 2009, p. 71. 
8
 Luttrell 2009, p. 2. 
9
 Frände, Havansi, et al. 2012, p. 1282. 
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parties to come to an agreement on the conduct of the arbitration procedure which is why 
arbitrators are, subject to party agreement, granted rather extensive substantive case 
management powers in order to conduct the proceedings in an effective and prompt 
manner and to come to a conclusion on the outcome of the dispute.
10
 However, due to the 
fact that commercial arbitration is considered a flexible alternative mechanism of dispute 
resolution suited for the tailored settlement of commercial disputes in accordance with the 
needs and requirements of the disputing parties, defining the scope of arbitrators’ 
substantive case management powers may become problematic.  
 
Substantive case management issues usually relate to trial documents, e.g. to the relief 
sought by the parties, their claims, the evidence and the legal arguments used to support 
the claims.
11
 The role of an arbitral tribunal in international commercial arbitration may be 
described as aiming at working out the parties’ will by using the tribunal’s right of inquiry. 
However, in order to ensure that the dispute is settled in accordance with the correct 
application of the law, an arbitral tribunal may be required to conduct its own independent 
research in relation to the substantive applicable law of the underlying dispute e.g. in a 
situation where the parties have not succeeded to provide adequate evidence on the 
contents of the applicable law despite the arbitral tribunal requesting them to do so.  
 
It is universally accepted that the burden of proving the facts of a dispute lies on the 
parties. However, the approaches in relation to the status of law differ between common 
law and civil law traditions. In common law systems, the parties are required to provide the 
legal arguments that support the sought relief, but many civil law countries on the other 
hand apply the Latin maxim jura novit curia under which parties need only to prove the 
facts supporting their claim and to merely identify the relief they seek.
12
 The effects of this 
fundamental divergence extend by analogy to the conduct of international arbitral 
proceedings.  
 
                                                        
10
 Gaillard and Savage 1999, p. 633. 
11
 Frände, Havansi, et al. 2012, p. 991. 
12
 ILA Report 2008, pp. 2–3. 
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1.2 Subject and Research Questions 
 
In practice, an international arbitrator may be faced with the difficulty of determining the 
contents of the applicable substantive law, as the arbitrator may not necessarily be familiar 
with it. The question arises whether the task of presenting the contents of the applicable 
substantive law lies entirely upon the parties – following the common law tradition – or 
whether the arbitral tribunal may base its decision on points of law introduced sua sponte 
as the courts may do in many civil law countries. The raised issues are significant in 
practice, as challenges to international arbitral awards have been said to be on the rise
13
. 
The losing party may be tempted to seek any possible ground for challenging the award in 
a situation where an arbitrator has ascertained and applied the law sua sponte and the 
validity of the award will be at risk in jurisdictions where the jura novit curia principle is 
not recognized as part of legal principles affecting arbitral proceedings.  
 
This Master’s Thesis shall examine the underlying legal framework in relation to the 
possibility of an arbitrator to determine the contents of the applicable substantive law in 
international commercial disputes with the specific aim of identifying the scope of an 
international arbitrator’s discretion to ascertain and apply the law sua sponte. The focus of 
the examination shall be on the jura novit curia principle and its effect on the discretionary 
powers and duties of an arbitral tribunal in respect of its task of rendering a final award. 
The actual research questions are the following: 
 
1. What is the effect of the jura novit curia principle in international commercial 
arbitration? Can an international arbitral tribunal ascertain and apply the law sua 
sponte in order to reach a decision based on the correct application of the law? Are 
international arbitral tribunals under a duty to do so? 
 
2. Moreover, what is the scope of the jura novit curia principle in international 
commercial arbitration? What are the general duties of an international arbitral 
tribunal towards the disputing parties and do these duties limit the possibilities of 
arbitrators to ascertain and apply the law sua sponte?  
 
                                                        
13
 Knuts 2012, p. 669. 
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As it shall be established below in Chapter 3, there exists no consensus of opinion as to 
whether an international arbitrator should be allowed or obligated to conduct independent 
research or in some other manner actively participate in the assessment of the contents of 
the applicable substantive law. Moreover, a uniform practice has not developed even 
though the question of the effect of the jura novit curia principle in international 
arbitration has been the object of discussion for quite some time
14
.
 
 
 
The subject of this thesis is, in accordance with its title, limited to the assessment of 
international commercial arbitration leaving thus outside the scope of the examination case 
law and material relating to other special types of arbitration such as investment 
arbitration. Moreover, considering that the question relating to the applicability of the jura 
novit curia principle is relevant merely in situations where the arbitrator is under a duty to 
settle a dispute between the parties based on law, decision making based on equity or ex 
aequo et bono shall also be outlined from the scope of the subject of this thesis.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Sources 
 
The research method of an academic study may be described as the group of practices and 
operations adopted in order to present information and rules, which can be used to revise 
and interpret the material observed as the outcome of the conducted examination.
15
 Thus, 
the adopted methodology can be seen as constituting the ensemble of the choices a 
researcher makes in relation to the object of the study, the material used in it, and the 
method in which it shall be conducted and the results presented.
16
 The methodological 
choices in legal academic studies tend to portray mostly practical legal dogmatics aiming 
at identifying the contents of the legislation in force regulating a specific legal problem
17
. 
Legal dogmatics may be defined as the interpretation of legal norms in an effective legal 
system.
18
 In practice, it is rather common for legal academics to include comparative 
aspects in legal dogmatical studies
19
. Comparative assessment is useful for deepening the 
knowledge of a given legal system in order to assist in its development. Comparative law 
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 Kaufmann-Kohler 2005, p. 635. 
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 Husa 1997, p. 21. 
16
 Klami 1980, p. 4. 
17
 Husa et al. 2005, p. 13 
18
 Aarnio 1989, p. 48. 
19
 Klami 1994, p. 6. 
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may also be exercised with an emphasis on legal dogmatics in which case the focus is 
shifted to assessing how an issue relating to a given legal rule is regulated in other legal 
systems
20
.  
 
This thesis shall use a practical legal dogmatical approach as the methodological point of 
view. The questions under examination relate to the active participation of an arbitral 
tribunal in ascertaining the contents of the applicable substantive law in settling a dispute 
and the effect this may have on the validity of the arbitral award. In international 
arbitration, the finality of the award is dependent on multiple aspects. An international 
arbitral award may be set aside by the court of the place of the arbitration if the arbitral 
proceedings have not followed the mandatory provisions set out in the national legislation 
of the same state.
21
 Thus, in order to provide the reader with a useful examination of the 
topic of this thesis, focus shall also be given to the assessment of approaches taken in 
various countries, albeit without using comparative law as the main methodological 
approach. The assessment shall be conducted with the aim of providing a useful 
presentation of the applicability of the jura novit curia principle in international arbitration, 
which may by its nature involve the application of various different legal sources.  
 
In addition to examining the current situation under Finnish law, the choice of the other 
addressed jurisdictions has been conducted mainly on practical grounds choosing other 
European countries that are considered “major places of arbitration”22. According to the 
results of a broad empirical study on the attitudes and practices of large companies in 
relation to international arbitration conducted by the School of International Arbitration in 
2010, the most popular and used seat of arbitration is London. In addition disputes are 
settled in great amounts in Paris, New York and Geneva.
23
 The choice of the comparative 
countries has thus been conducted to include England, Finland, France and Switzerland. 
These countries also represent advantageous examples, as they have adopted different 
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 Husa et al. 2005, p. 15. 
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 It should be noted that in addition, the enforcement of an international award may be objected before the 
national court of the place where enforcement of the award is sought. This thesis shall however focus its 
assessment mainly on questions relating to the provisions relating to the validity of arbitral awards provided 
in both transnational and national arbitration laws.  
22
 Webster 2006, pp. 433–434. 
23
 The results of the study are based on an enquiry comprising of 136 questions in addition to 67 interviews 
conducted on representatives of companies in different fields of business in different parts of the world. Of 
the respondents 35 % were located in Asia, 31% in West Europe, 12% in North America, 9% in Africa and 
the Middle East, 6% in South and Central America and 6% in East Europe.  
 7 
approaches in relation to the application of the jura novit curia principle in civil and 
arbitral proceedings, which is why a detailed assessment of the said countries proves useful 
especially since international arbitration has been said to be under an aim of 
harmonization
24
 and because the current aims at harmonizing international arbitral 
proceedings will lose their effect if the approaches in different legal systems vary 
considerably. 
 
Although the subject of this thesis, i.e. the effect and scope of the jura novit curia principle 
in international commercial arbitration, has been much debated by academic authors as 
well as having been a largely discussed topic by arbitration praticitioners in various 
seminars inter alia on the subject of international arbitration, the existing material on the 
subject is characterized by a pandemonium of arguments which are in need of a 
comprehensible compilation. This thesis aims to provide such a compilation of the 
different positions taken by academic authors and arbitration practitioners in addition to 
establishing a comprehensive presentation of the myriad of applicable rules and 
regulations, which may affect the conduct of international arbitrations everywhere in the 
world, albeit with a special emphasis on the so-called major places of arbitration in 
Europe.  
 
Most of the materials used as a source are articles written by legal scholars and arbitration 
practitioners, because there exist no specific books on the application of the jura novit 
curia principle in international arbitration. The books referred to are mostly written by 
leading experts on international commercial arbitration and they either contain a chapter on 
the subject or deals with the matters accordingly in respect of the issues which the 
application of the principle may affect; i.e. in relation with chapters concerning the topic of 
challenging international arbitral awards and refusing the recognition and enforcement of 
awards inter alia.  
 
Hence, this thesis shall examine the approach taken in the mentioned countries by mostly 
focusing on current case law on the subject. The assessment of these legal systems is 
advantageous because, as it shall be presented in Chapter 4 below, the finality of an 
international arbitral award depends on the approach taken by the national court of the 
place of the arbitration in relation to the grounds for setting aside an award.  
                                                        
24
 See e.g. Kaufmann-Kohler 2003, pp. 1320–1322; Cairns 2010, p. 306. 
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1.4 Structure 
 
The subject matter relating to the applicability of the jura novit curia principle in 
international commercial arbitral proceedings is quite complex and, therefore, requires an 
assessment of the underlying legal framework of international arbitration before embarking 
on a more detailed examination of the effect of the principle itself. Hence, this Master’s 
Thesis shall begin with a brief presentation of the main legal theories underlying the study 
of arbitration as an independent legal subject matter in order to proceed with a presentation 
of the existing legal sources which may affect the conduct of arbitral proceedings and more 
specifically which may have an effect on the powers and duties of an arbitral tribunal in its 
task of settling the matter between the disputing parties. In addition, Chapter 2 shall 
address the possibility of using analogy from court proceedings as a possible source in 
determining whether the jura novit curia principle is applicable also in international 
arbitral proceedings.  
 
After establishing the general legal basis underlying the conduct of international 
commercial arbitral proceedings, the examination shall continue with an assessment of the 
role of an international arbitrator in ascertaining and applying the substantive law. Chapter 
3 shall begin with a presentation of the current situation of diverging opinions amongst 
academic authors and arbitration practitioners in relation to the suitability of the jura novit 
curia principle in the field of international commercial arbitration. The chapter shall 
continue with an assessment of the different provisions regulating an arbitrator’s 
substantive case management powers in order to determine whether there exist any 
restrictions to the application of the principle and to conclude the examination with a 
proposition of consolidating the principle into international commercial arbitration.   
 
In order to assess the actual scope of an international arbitrator’s freedom in ascertaining 
and applying the law sua sponte, Chapter 4 shall present the existing arbitration legislation 
and case law of the four jurisdictions chosen for a more detailed examination in order to 
determine whether any procedural duties of an arbitrator may restrict the application of the 
jura novit curia principle in international arbitral proceedings. The said procedural duties 
are i) the duty to render a valid arbitral award, ii) the duty not to exceed one’s mandate and 
 9 
iii) the duty to ensure due process is followed in the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. 
The assessment shall be conducted by comparing the results and determining whether there 
can be detected any common features between the case law of the four different 
jurisdictions in order to conclude on the possibility to determine the exact scope of 
application of the jura novit curia principle.   
 
The final conclusions of the examination conducted in this Master’s Thesis shall be 
summarized in Chapter 5. The chapter shall also include general remarks and advice for an 
international arbitrator as regards the possibility of ascertaining and applying the 
substantive law sua sponte in rendering an arbitral award without risking its validity and 
by corollary the finality of the arbitral proceedings. 
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2. CONDUCT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS – 
GENERAL FEATURES 
 
An international arbitral tribunal may be required to apply a wide range of legal rules and 
principles including rules governing the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, rules governing 
the procedure, conflict of law rules, rules governing the issues relevant to the solution of 
the merits of the dispute and rules governing the enforcement and recognition of the 
arbitral award.
25
 The question whether the principle of jura novit curia may be applied in 
international commercial arbitration is in its nature procedural. Thus, this chapter shall 
begin with an introduction into the leading theories of arbitration in order to continue with 
a discussion of some of the rules and principles regulating the conduct of international 
arbitral proceedings in order to proceed, in the following chapters, with an elaborate 
examination of the applicability and the scope of the principle in the field of international 
commercial arbitration. Lastly, analogy from court proceedings shall be examined as a 
possible legal source for determining the width of an arbitrator’s powers and duties in 
determining the contents of the applicable substantive law in order to make a decision on 
the disputed matter.  
 
2.1  Leading Theories of Arbitration 
 
The use of arbitration as a means of settling commercial disputes, although having existed 
for centuries
26
, has significantly increased during the past few decades. As a consequence, 
the study of arbitration has motivated the suggestion of several theories pursuing an 
examination of the juridical nature of arbitration as an independent dispute resolution 
mechanism. Although lacking unanimous support amidst academic authors and arbitration 
practitioners, four leading theories have received most attention. The said theories are i) 
the contractual theory, ii) the autonomous (sui juris) theory, iii) the jurisdictional theory, 
and iv) the hybrid or mixed theory.  
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 A thorough overview on the history of arbitration remains unwritten. For a shorter presentation see e.g. 
Born 2009, pp. 7–64.   
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According to the contractual school of thought, arbitration is understood as a form of 
contractual relations
27
. It is regarded as depending for its existence and continuity on the 
parties’ agreement. The entire arbitration process, from the arbitration agreement to the 
arbitral award, is considered as being based on contractual arrangements. Supporters of 
this theory deny the primacy or control of the state in arbitration and argue that the very 
essence of arbitration lies in the fact that it is created by the will and consent of the 
parties.
28
 However, the contractual theory has been subject to criticism. Lew et al. argue 
that although it is true that the consensual nature of arbitration plays an instrumental role in 
the initiation of arbitration proceedings, once proceedings have commenced, the parties 
play only a limited role while the arbitral tribunal is empowered to make important 
decisions.
29
  
 
The ideas relating to the autonomous theory originated in 1965. This theory presumes that 
arbitration evolves in an emancipated regime emphasizing its autonomous character. The 
supporters of this view consider that arbitration can be determined, in fact and in law, by 
looking at its use and purpose. The autonomous theory looks into arbitration per se and 
recognizes that the relevant laws have developed to help to facilitate the smooth working 
of arbitration.
30
 It has been stated, however, that it remains unclear what doctrinal or 
practical consequences result from this theory.
31
   
 
On the basis of these two theories, the application of the principle of jura novit curia could 
not be ordered by the state, because the state does not, according to the supporters of both 
of these theories, have any influence on arbitration. Nevertheless, both the contractual and 
autonomous theories have been criticized for the fact that the intent and agreement of the 
parties cannot exist in a legal vacuum. The fact that national legislation evolves in 
interaction with the developments in practice is not in itself sufficient to exclude its 
effects.
32
  
 
The jurisdictional theory on the other hand takes the effect of national legislation into 
account. This theory relies on the state’s power to control and regulate arbitrations taking 
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 Lew, Mistelis, et al. 2003, pp. 77–78. 
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 Lew, Mistelis, et al. 2003, p. 79. 
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place within its jurisdiction. Parties are understood to be able to submit to arbitration only 
to the extent expressly allowed or implicitly accepted by the law of the place of arbitration, 
i.e. the lex arbitri. The jurisdictional theory views arbitrators as exercising a public 
function and consequently, the role of an arbitrator is considered quasi-judicial in its 
nature.
33
 Primary importance is therefore given to the role of national law while 
contemplating greater limits on the parties’ autonomy compared to the other three 
theories.
34
 Under this theory the principle of jura novit curia could be considered as 
imposing a duty on the arbitral tribunal, since it could be argued that due to the fact that the 
tribunal derives its authority by delegation from the state, the state can demand that 
arbitrators execute the state’s interests. Nevertheless, the jurisdictional theory has been 
criticized for the fact that it fails to take into account the reality of the consensual nature of 
arbitration.
35
  
 
All in all each of the mentioned theories fails to take into account the fact that arbitration 
has both contractual and jurisdictional features. The so-called hybrid or mixed theory aims 
at constituting a compromise in this respect. According to the hybrid theory private 
adjudication can exist without delegation from the state since the private adjudication 
process merely gains power when enforced by a state.
36
 In a nutshell, the private justice 
system is created by contract. The hybrid theory has become a dominant theory worldwide, 
as both contractual and jurisdictional elements are found in modern law and practice of 
international arbitration.
37
  
 
The divide of opinion in relation to the theoretical analysis of the legal nature of arbitration 
lies in the core of the academic debate on the subject of this thesis, i.e. the application of 
the jura novit curia principle in international commercial arbitration. The possibility of 
applying the principle in international commercial arbitration is also highlighted by a great 
inconsistency of opinion amidst academic authors and arbitration practitioners. The general 
divide of opinion observed in legal literature can roughly be divided into four sub-
categories, which shall be presented in more detail under Chapter 3 of this thesis; i) those 
who are against the application of the principle in international arbitration, ii) those who 
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 Lew, Mistelis, et al. 2003, pp. 74–75. 
34
 Born 2009, p. 186. 
35
 Isele 2010, p. 19. 
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 Ibid.  
37
 Lew, Mistelis, et al. 2003, p. 80. 
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fully support its application with the view that the principle imposes a positive duty on the 
arbitrator, iii) those who find that the principle may be partially applied depending on the 
judicial nature of the applicable substantive law, and iv) those who find that the principle 
may be adapted with the specific characteristics of international arbitration by interpreting 
the principle in a more flexible manner as granting the arbitrator the authority to conduct 
independent research without imposing any obligations on the arbitral tribunal.    
 
2.2  Applicable Texts and Principles   
 
The topic of this thesis concerns the powers and duties of arbitrators in taking a proactive 
role in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings and applying the substantive law 
independently in order to resolve the disputed matter. The question of the applicability of 
the jura novit curia principle is procedural in its essence. Therefore, it is useful to begin 
with a brief presentation of the legal principles, rules, legislations and other materials 
which may affect the conduct of international arbitral proceedings.  
 
2.2.1 Priority of Party Autonomy 
 
Although the tendency of the evolution in international commercial arbitration has been to 
grant arbitrators greater procedural freedom and to favor flexibility in comparison to the 
strict procedural rules generally governing court proceedings
38
, the principle of party 
autonomy remains one of the cornerstones of international arbitration
39
.
 
The consensual 
nature of commercial arbitration is highlighted by the fact that arbitrators derive their 
authority from the arbitration agreement between the disputing parties. Arbitration 
agreements may also sometimes specify what powers the arbitral tribunal shall have in 
fulfilling its duties. 
 
 
It is universally agreed that the intent of the parties plays a leading role in determining the 
conduct of proceedings regardless of which law governs the arbitration. The parties may 
exercise their autonomy e.g. by including specific procedural rules in the arbitration 
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 Mayer 1995, p. 165. 
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 See e.g. Hobér 2001, p. 84; Waincymer 2011, p. 210. 
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agreement, by reference to institutional arbitration rules or in case ad hoc arbitration is 
preferred reference can be made to transnational arbitration rules.
40
 In the absence of 
express agreement between the parties on the procedure to be adopted, the general view is 
that the arbitration is subject to the arbitration legislation of the seat of the arbitration (”lex 
arbitri”) 41.  
 
Despite the flexibility as to the variety of choice of applicable laws and rules dealing with 
arbitral proceedings, these do not tend to include detailed provisions on the specific 
procedures to be followed
42
. Therefore, arbitrators are often left with a great deal of 
discretion in making decisions on the conduct of arbitral proceedings. Nevertheless, the 
principle of party autonomy must be acknowledged at all times when considering the scope 
of an international arbitrator’s ability to independently ascertain and apply the substantive 
law of a dispute. Any powers an arbitral tribunal may possess in deciding a dispute 
between the parties must not excessively restrict the fundamental principle of party 
autonomy.  
 
2.2.2 Texts and Materials Guiding the Conduct of International Arbitral 
Proceedings 
 
The selection of applicable arbitration rules and laws available for parties to choose from 
in relation to the conduct of international arbitral proceedings is extensive. In addition to 
being able to tailor the proceedings to suit their specific needs, the parties may opt to have 
their arbitration administered by an international arbitration institution (institutional 
arbitration) or arrange for the selection of arbitrators, the designation of rules, etc. 
themselves (ad hoc arbitration). The arbitral tribunal must then comply with the procedural 
rules determined by the applicable regulation. However, the arbitration laws of the seat of 
arbitration also play a considerable role even where the relevant lex arbitri has not been 
explicitly chosen to regulate the arbitral proceedings by the disputing parties or the arbitral 
tribunal.  
 
                                                        
40
 Lew, Mistelis, et al. 2003, pp. 523–524. 
41
 See e.g. Redfern and Hunter 2004, p. 83; Kurkela 2003, p. 486. 
42
 See the following chapter. 
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A brief presentation of some of the applicable texts and materials shall be provided in the 
following chapters. These examples have been chosen due to their significance arising 
from their popularity of their use in international commercial arbitration or because they 
shall be further assessed in this thesis. The chosen examples do not represent an exhaustive 
list of the applicable texts within each category. A divide has also been made between 
rules and provisions which bind the arbitral tribunal and other materials which provide 
non-binding guidance to arbitrators.  
 
2.2.2.1 Binding Texts 
 
a) Institutional Arbitration Rules 
 
Arbitration rules are issued by arbitration institutions. When the disputing parties agree on 
the use of the services provided by an arbitration institution, they simultaneously agree on 
the application of the institution’s arbitration rules. It is believed that there are currently 
approximately one hundred arbitration institutions having international significance.
43
  
 
The ICC was founded in Paris in 1919 and since 1923 it comprises an International Court 
of Arbitration
44
. ICC Arbitration has been said to be the most widely used and accepted 
international arbitration institution
45
, which was also confirmed in the study conducted by 
the School of International Arbitration in 2010
46
. The current ICC Rules of Arbitration are 
in force as of 1 January 2012.
47
 Although new innovations were introduced in the revised 
ICC Arbitration Rules
48
, no significant changes were made to the content of the articles 
under review in this thesis.  
 
Having been established in 1891 and formally inaugurated in 1892, the LCIA is the oldest 
arbitration institution and nowadays universally recognized as one of the world’s leading 
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arbitral institutions.
 49 
The latest version of the LCIA Arbitration Rules came into force on 
1 January 1998. The LCIA Arbitration Rules are currently under review.
50
 
 
The rules of arbitral institutions often remain silent on how the applicable substantive law 
of a dispute and its contents should be ascertained in international arbitration. The 
provisions are generally restricted to merely establishing that the tribunal shall apply the 
law or rules of law designated by the parties and where no such designation has been 
given, the tribunal shall apply the law it determines to be appropriate. However, under 
Article 22(1)(c) of the LCIA Rules the tribunal is granted with the power to sua sponte 
ascertain the relevant facts and the law applicable, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 
The arbitral tribunal must, nevertheless, provide the parties with “a reasonable opportunity 
to state their views”.  
 
b) Transnational Arbitration Rules 
 
The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were prepared under the auspices of the United Nations 
originally in response to an increasing need for a neutral set of arbitration rules suitable for 
use in ad hoc arbitration.
51
 The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were approved on 28 April 
1976 and their current revised version has been in effect since 15 August 2010.
52
 Although 
the UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules were developed in the auspices of the United Nations, 
they have a purely contractual status and apply only to arbitral proceedings if the disputing 
parties have agreed thereto in writing
53
. Like institutional arbitration rules, the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules remain equally silent as to guiding arbitrators in ascertaining and 
applying the law.  
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c) Transnational Arbitration Laws 
 
The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards of 1958 has been described as the most important international treaty relating to 
international commercial arbitration
54
. Its primary objective is to deal with the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by obliging parties to ensure that non-domestic 
arbitral awards are recognized and generally capable of enforcement in their jurisdiction in 
the same way as domestic awards.
55
 Due to the New York Convention an arbitral award is 
recognized and enforced in most countries of the world
56
 and has thus contributed 
significantly to the success of international arbitration as a means of commercial dispute 
resolution. The New York Convention was signed in 1958 and entered into force on 7 June 
1959. As its title indicates, the New York Convention governs the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and does not, hence, include any specific provisions 
regarding the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. However, the grounds for enforceability 
are similar to the grounds of invalidity contained in the UNCITRAL Model Law.  
 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985 (hereinafter 
“the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law” or “the Model Law”) was designed to assist states in 
reforming and modernizing their laws on arbitral procedure so as to take into account the 
particular features and needs of international commercial arbitration. The Model Law 
covers all stages of the arbitral process from the arbitration agreement to the recognition 
and enforcement of the arbitral award. The latest amendments were adopted by 
UNICTRAL on 7 July 2006.
57
 The Model Law contains rules, which are universally 
recognized in the practice of international commercial arbitration and even legislatures that 
have decided not to adopt it as such cannot entirely ignore its guiding effect
58
.  
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d) National Arbitration Laws 
 
Arbitration necessarily takes place within the framework of a legal system. In most cases, 
in default of an agreement between the parties, this framework is defined, according to the 
generally accepted view, by the national arbitration law of the seat of the arbitration (lex 
arbitri).
59
 However, most national arbitration laws do not contain detailed guidance in 
relation to the arbitration procedure. Guidance on the matter is practically non-existent
60
. 
Therefore, in absence of express party agreement, most arbitration laws grant arbitral 
tribunals a wide discretion in determining how to conduct the arbitral proceedings. 
Generally, national arbitration laws merely state general conflict of law rules, determine 
the law applicable to the merits and contain general rules on the conduct of proceedings.  
 
Moreover, national arbitration laws do not generally include provisions empowering 
arbitrators to take initiatives in ascertaining the contents of the applicable substantive law 
in international arbitration. However, an exception is notably provided in section 34(1) of 
the 1996 English Arbitration Act, under which the tribunal shall decide all procedural and 
evidential matters, subject to the parties agreeing to the contrary. Under section 34(1)(2)(g) 
of the Act “procedural and evidential matters include […] whether and to what extent the 
tribunal should itself take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law”. Thus, the 
English Arbitration Act expressly recognizes the possibility for the arbitral tribunal to 
decide whether it should take initiative in ascertaining the contents of the applicable law. 
Under the wording of section 34(1)(2)(g) of the Act, the disputing parties are primarily 
vested with the freedom to provide for the application of the principle of jura novit curia 
because in absence of party agreement discretion is granted to the tribunal itself.    
 
While the rules governing the conduct of the arbitral proceedings, irrespective of whether 
they are institutional or transnational arbitration rules or whether they provide from the 
provisions of the applicable lex arbitri, are considered as the norms applicable to the 
procedure to be followed before the arbitrators, the lex arbitri has in fact a wider scope of 
application because it governs the arbitration as a whole. In other words, the importance of 
the lex arbitri is not limited to the fact whether or not the applicable national arbitration 
law applies to the actual arbitral proceedings. The lex arbitri has also bearing e.g. on the 
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relationship between an arbitral tribunal and the courts, specifically on the challenge 
proceedings available before these courts. Thus, the lex arbitri deals with the control by 
the courts of arbitrators’ activities in addition to containing rules applicable to arbitral 
proceedings.
61
  
 
Therefore, the importance of the lex arbitri may be considered as being twofold. Even 
where specific institutional, transnational or other arbitration rules have been explicitly 
chosen to govern the arbitral proceedings by the parties, the provisions of the lex arbitri 
govern the validity of the arbitral award, i.e. the decision of the arbitral tribunal may be 
challenged before the courts where the arbitrators have not conducted the arbitral 
proceedings also in accordance with the mandatory fundamental principles of the 
applicable lex arbitri. These principles shall be further discussed below in Chapter 2.2.3. 
 
2.2.2.2 Non-Binding Texts 
 
The fact that the applicable arbitration laws and rules provide no detailed guidance on how 
arbitrators should conduct arbitral proceedings and more specifically on the role of 
arbitrators in relation to the ascertaining and applying the substantive law sua sponte, no 
uniform practice has developed in the field of international arbitration
62
. The lack of a 
homogenous practice does not promote harmonization of international commercial 
arbitration and thus the lacuna in the existing arbitration laws and rules has been subject to 
attempts of being remedied with non-binding texts and materials. Recent attempts of 
providing arbitrators with non-binding guidance on the conduct of international 
commercial arbitral proceedings include the report of the ILA approved in 2008 and the 
compilation of existing case law on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law provided by the 
United Nations Commission of International Trade issued in 2012.  
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a) ILA’s Final Report Ascertaining the Contents of the Applicable Law in 
International Commercial Arbitration of 2008 
 
The ILA’s Committee on International Commercial Arbitration (hereinafter ”the ILA 
Committee” or “Committee”) was set up to study the applicability of the principle of jura 
novit curia at the ILA’s 72nd conference in 2006 and in August 2008 the Committee’s Final 
Report Ascertaining the Contents of the Applicable Law in International Commercial 
Arbitration (hereinafter ”the 2008 ILA Report”) was approved by the ILA at the 73rd 
conference held in Rio de Janeiro.  
 
The 2008 ILA Report includes 15 recommendations on how arbitrators ought to approach 
the question of ascertaining the contents of the applicable law in international commercial 
arbitration. The recommendations are not legally binding hence arbitrators will not be 
sanctioned if they decide not to follow them. In other words, the recommendations merely 
aim to provide non-binding guidance on the question, which has not been dealt with in 
national arbitration laws or other rules on the conduct of international arbitral proceedings. 
The 2008 ILA Report is thus aimed at providing non-binding guidance to inter alia 
arbitrators and practitioners and shall thus be taken into consideration in the assessment 
conducted in this thesis.   
 
b) UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration of 2012 
 
The UNCITRAL Digest of Case Law on the Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration (hereinafter ”the 2012 UNCITRAL Case Digest”) published in 2012 is a 
presentation of case law rendered in jurisdictions having enacted the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration of 1985. The UNICTRAL Case Digest 
contains information on cases collected in the CLOUT
63
 and is aimed at promoting a 
uniform interpretation and application of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law. The 2012 
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UNCITRAL Case Digest is, therefore, meant to help inter alia judges, arbitrators, 
practitioners and academics use more efficiently the case law relating to the Model Law.  
 
2.2.2.3 Relevance of the Lex Arbitri to the Validity of the Arbitral Award 
 
It has been argued that since an international arbitral tribunal has no nationality it needs to 
establish its own rules for determining the content of the applicable law. Where the parties 
have not agreed on the process to be followed, arbitral tribunals have the flexibility to fix 
the arbitration procedure as they deem appropriate. However, the practices and prejudices 
of national systems continue to have an important impact on arbitral proceedings.
64
 As 
already mentioned, in the absence of party agreement on the process to be followed, the 
arbitral proceedings are, in accordance with the territoriality principle, generally governed 
by the arbitration law of the place in which the tribunal has its seat.
65
  
 
Moreover, even if the parties have opted for the application of e.g. institutional arbitration 
rules, the lex arbitri remains relevant in the context of inter alia the validity of the arbitral 
award because the losing party may challenge the validity of the arbitral award before the 
national court of the state where the award has been rendered. The national courts of the 
seat of the arbitration have, therefore, the chance of controlling the validity of the award 
based on their national arbitration law. The list of grounds upon which a national court 
may declare an arbitral award invalid varies between states. For example in England 
judges have relatively wide powers and may verify the arbitral tribunal’s application of the 
law
66
, but in most European jurisdictions the exhaustive lists of invalidity grounds broadly 
coincide with the list of grounds contained in article 34 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model 
Law.
67
  
 
Hence, while international arbitration is primarily based on party autonomy due to its 
consensual nature and although it is widely affected by international sources, which aim to 
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provide a uniform legal framework, national arbitration laws continue to have significant 
relevance in respect of the validity of the arbitral award.
68
 Thus, Chapter 4 of this thesis 
shall be dedicated to examining the contents of international and national sources in 
relation to the mentioned invalidity grounds in order to trace the bounds of the scope of the 
arbitral tribunal’s freedom in managing international arbitral proceedings.   
 
2.2.3 Principles Affecting the Conduct of International Arbitral 
Proceedings 
 
As explained above in Chapter 2.2.2.1.d), the disputing parties and the arbitrators cannot 
avoid the applicable lex arbitri, i.e. the law of governing the seat of the arbitration. They 
can merely select the seat of the arbitration and thus indirectly choose the applicable lex 
arbitri and be granted the autonomy which the said law allows them. In other words, the 
mandatory provisions of the applicable lex arbitri set the ultimate bounds to party 
autonomy and to the arbitral tribunal’s discretion also in relation to the conduct of the 
arbitral proceedings. However, although arbitrators are normally advised to seek the 
parties’ approval on how the arbitration proceedings should be conducted, agreement is 
rarely reached once a dispute has arisen
69
. The arbitral tribunal will normally, therefore, be 
left with a wide discretion in relation to fixing the arbitration procedure in the manner it 
considers most appropriate.  
 
Notwithstanding the nationality of the parties and the applicable substantive law of the 
dispute, arbitral proceedings are governed by specific principles that have developped 
along with the evolution of international arbitration. The said principles have been 
approved in various bilateral arbitration treaties and codified in numerous multilateral 
conventions, model laws and model rules both in the rules of international organizations 
and institutions in a way that they are nowadays considered generally applicable in 
international arbitration, unless the parties have expressly agreed to the contrary.
70
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2.2.3.1 Jura Novit Curia Principle 
 
The topic of this thesis refers to a principle of procedural law under which the parties are 
not required to prove the content of the law before national courts
71
. It literally translates to 
“the judge knows the law”, but the definitions of the principle are manifold72. Jura novit 
curia derives from another Latin maxim “da mihi facto, dabo tibi ius”, which translates to 
“give me the facts and I will give you the law” meaning that the court, while relying upon 
the parties to provide the facts, may consider and apply laws beyond the legal arguments or 
reasoning submitted by the parties.
73
 The principle emerged from the ideology that law is 
something definite and certain which does not require proof. In this sense law could be 
applied correctly since it constitutes an objective standard that treats like circumstances 
alike. By acknowledging the application of the jura novit curia principle, states authorize 
domestic judges to go beyond the legal submissions of the parties in order to come to a 
correct application of the law.
74
  
 
In its strictest sense, the principle imposes a duty upon the judge to know the law and to 
dispose of the case accordingly in addition to a burden upon a judge to educate himself on 
the unfamiliar contents of law.
75
 However, regardless of the diversity of the principle’s 
definitions, the common conception is that jura novit curia allows the court to base its 
decision on legal reasons that have not necessarily been advanced by the parties.
76
 The 
principle, in other words, empowers the courts to qualify the issues in a manner departing 
from that proposed by the parties.
77
 The definition of the jura novit curia principle adopted 
in this thesis follows the reasoning of Chainais, who states that the literal translation of the 
principle is illusionary as it revolves around the assumption that the judge, or the arbitrator, 
knows the law. In fact, the definition supported by the author is subtler as it is perceived as 
describing that the mission of the judge is to observe that the law is followed. 
Consequently, since the judge has the means of ascertaining the law, the parties would not 
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be required to prove it. An extension of the principle could in that case be found in the 
maxim ”da mihi factum, dabo tibi ius”.78  
  
The multiple nuances of the meaning of jura novit curia lie at the centre of the debate on 
the topic of its effect in international arbitration, particularly, whether the principle ought 
to be comprehended as imposing an obligation to ascertain the contents of the applicable 
substantive law on the arbitral tribunal or as merely enabling the arbitral tribunal to do so. 
The fact that the principle appears to have been rejected in common law jurisdictions 
which apply the “adversarial” trial method, as opposed to the “inquisitorial” trial method 
applied in civil law jurisdictions has also contributed to the divergence of opinions of legal 
authors and practitioners on the subject. The differences between common law and civil 
law jurisdictions shall be more thoroughly discussed below in Chapter 2.3.1.  
 
2.2.3.2 Fundamental Principles of Arbitration 
 
Although arbitral proceedings are not usually specifically regulated by arbitration rules or 
by arbitration laws, the validity and enforcement of arbitral awards are. Moreover, the 
mandatory fundamental principles arising from the applicable lex arbitri do indeed have an 
important effect on the conduct of the arbitral proceedings. Some of these principles are so 
fundamental that arbitration rules and laws may even sanction their violation.
79
  
  
a) Ne Ultra Petita - Excess of Power 
 
Due to the legal nature of arbitration, an arbitral award is not legally valid if basic 
principles of law have been breached. Hence, arbitrators are bound by the principles of law 
applicable to the dispute, which may arise from the terms of agreement of the mandate to 
arbitrate, the applicable substantive law and the applicable lex arbitri. Arbitrators are thus 
generally bound by the limits of their mandate as well as the principle of due process in the 
use of their discretion relating to ascertaining and applying the law on their own 
initiative.
80
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Most arbitration rules and legislations provide for the setting aside of an arbitral award in a 
situation where an arbitrator has not complied with his mission. The mission of an 
arbitrator defines his powers and his duties, so this ground for setting an award aside has a 
wide scope in addition to being raised quite frequently in practice.
81
 The arbitrator will be 
considered as having exceeded his mission when he has decided ultra or extra petita, i.e. 
going beyond or exceeding the parties’ claims or prayers for relief. For example, if the 
award goes beyond the factual scope of the dispute as agreed upon the parties, it exceeds 
the power granted to the arbitral tribunal. As such, the arbitral award may be held invalid. 
 
b) Due Process  
 
Modern principles of procedural fairness derive from two maxims of law. Under the first 
one every man has a right to an impartial and independent adjudicator deriving from the 
maxim that no man may be a judge in his own cause (”nemo judex in sua causa”) and the 
second one provides that no man shall be condemned unheard (”audi alteram partem”). 
Observing the first maxim requires that only an arbitrator who has no significant interest in 
the cause and no preference with respect to the disputing parties may sit in determination 
of it. Abiding by the second one presumes that the arbitrator must recognize the parties’ 
right to be heard, to present evidence, to make submissions and more generally to confront 
one’s accusers.82 The two key elements of due process are i) the obligation to treat the 
parties equally and ii) to give each an adequate opportunity to present its case. In some 
jurisdictions such as France the notion of due process includes the right of each party to be 
given a reasonable opportunity of putting its case (audi alteram partem) in addition to 
dealing with that of its opponent (“principle of contradiction”).83  
 
An arbitral award may not be based on a question of law that the parties have not invoked 
or discussed during the arbitral proceedings, if this would deprive the parties of their right 
to be heard. Moreover, if the parties are not given an opportunity to present evidence on 
                                                        
81
 Poudret and Besson 2007, p. 741. 
82
 Luttrell 2009, p. 2. 
83
 Delvolvé, Pointon, et al. 2009, p. 248. 
 26 
questions of law which affect the outcome of the dispute, the parties may be considered as 
not having been granted an opportunity to present their case.
84
 
 
2.2.3.3 Procedural Principles of Arbitration 
 
The speed and practicality of arbitral proceedings are considered as a few of the main 
advantages of commercial arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. The fact that an 
arbitral award is final means that a dispute can be settled very promptly in comparison with 
court proceedings which allow appeals to the decisions of lower courts and thus resulting 
in the prolongation of solving commercial disputes. In addition, the fact that the disputing 
parties are free to choose the arbitrators enables a choice of expertise in relation to the 
constitution of the arbitral tribunal.  
 
There is also a cost aspect in arbitration, which does not apply in civil litigations. An 
arbitral tribunal must take issues relating to the costs of proceedings into account as the 
parties cover the costs of the arbitral proceedings. This may become relevant in examining 
the applicability of the jura novit curia principle in international arbitration since whenever 
the arbitral tribunal is under a heavier duty to research and ascertain the content of 
unfamiliar substantive law the costs of arbitration may increase.
85
  
 
These procedural principles are usually also provided for in arbitration laws and rules. For 
example under section 33(1)(b) of the 1996 English Arbitration Act an arbitral tribunal is 
to “adopt procedures suitable to the circumstances of the particular case, avoiding 
unnecessary delay or expense, so as to provide a fair means for the resolution of the 
matters falling to be determined.” A similar provision is contained for example in section 
27(1) of the Finnish Arbitration Act (967/1992) under which “the arbitral tribunal shall 
promote an appropriate and speedy settlement of the matter". 
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2.3  Analogy From Court Proceedings 
 
Some legal authors have suggested the possibility of considering analogy from court 
proceedings as a possible legal basis for the application of the principle of jura novit curia 
in international commercial arbitration. This would by corollary imply the appropriateness 
of civil proceedings having a directional effect on arbitral proceedings. On the other hand, 
the effect of the analogy could also be considered to be limited because of the fundamental 
differences between civil proceedings and arbitral proceedings. This chapter shall provide 
a brief examination of the principle’s effect within court proceedings in the different states 
chosen for comparison and present some of the main differences between civil law and 
common law jurisdictions in order to assess whether analogy from court proceedings can 
be considered as providing appropriate direction on how to conduct arbitral proceedings. 
 
2.3.1 Divergences Between Common Law and Civil Law Systems 
 
The common law and civil law systems are the two most widespread legal systems in the 
world. The common law system is in use in most English-speaking countries, whereas the 
civil law system is in use in Continental Europe and the countries around the world 
influenced by Continental Europe (e.g. Japan, most of Africa and all of Latin America). 
The two legal systems differ significantly in how a dispute is commenced, developed and 
presented which highlights the importance of the differences in the area of international 
arbitration.
86
  
 
Civil procedure in civil law countries follows the so-called inquisitorial model, according 
to which the court plays a proactive role remaining actively involved in the management of 
the case during the proceedings.
87
 It is generally considered in civil law jurisdictions that 
justice can be better served by granting the courts inquisitorial power to search the truth.  
This view is based on the presumption that the courts are in the best position to apply the 
law correctly and in its entirety while parties may present the law in a partisan manner or 
even deliberately not advance the full scope of the applicable law e.g. if it includes 
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unfavorable aspects.
 88
 Civil law jurisdictions consider the lex causae in court proceedings 
a matter of law and not of fact, which means that a judge is required to educate himself on 
its contents (this requirement can also be referred to as “the burden of education”89). In 
other words, the principle of jura novit curia is generally accepted in court litigation within 
civil law systems.  
 
The law in common law countries consists of a mixture of common law and legislation. 
Proceedings in common law courts may be described as “adversarial” as against the 
“inquisitorial” system normally referred to in civil law countries. In common law 
proceedings the parties are fully in charge of preparing the case for trial and have also the 
main role at trial. Judges in common law systems have been described to traditionally take 
the role of a “passive umpire in a match between two opposing parties”.90 In common law 
jurisdictions the lex causae is considered a fact rather than law and the parties are required 
to prove its contents. Therefore, the principle of jura novit curia does not apply and the 
court does not conduct investigations beyond the parties’ submissions.91  
 
However, international arbitration is not easily classified as belonging to the civil law or 
common law system. The flexible nature of arbitration entails the possibility to adapt the 
procedure to the individual circumstances of the case. Thus, arbitration allows the parties 
and the arbitral tribunal to tailor the proceedings to the circumstances of the individual 
case and e.g. combining procedural aspects from both legal systems.
92
 Moreover, even if 
such classification were possible, as it shall be further discussed below in the following 
chapters, the arbitration law within Europe that mostly represents the common law 
systems, i.e. English law, does not reflect an adversarial approach in the strict sense. The 
1996 English Arbitration Act does not seem to be substantially different from the approach 
taken in civil law countries.
93
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2.3.2 Court Approaches to Ascertaining and Applying the Law 
 
It has been suggested that the question whether an arbitral tribunal has the authority to 
apply the jura novit curia principle, depends on the legal culture of arbitrators and whether 
the arbitrators perceive the question of lex causae as a matter of law or of fact
94
. It shall be 
briefly presented below how judges in the four European countries ascertain and apply the 
law in national court proceedings. The objective is to point out the main differences in the 
attitudes of judges, i.e. the effects of the jura novit curia principle, within the chosen 
jurisdictions, in relation to the application of national and foreign law, in order to pursue 
with a discussion of the possible influence of the analogy from court proceedings on 
international arbitral proceedings in Chapter 2.3.3.  
 
a) England 
In English law it is generally the parties’ responsibility to obtain the evidence to support 
their contestations. The court will not undertake this task itself. Nevertheless, English 
judges generally undertake an assisting role with respect to the parties’ responsibility of 
obtaining evidence on the contents of the law e.g. by making orders for disclosure of 
documents, requests for further information, disclosure of witnesses’ statements and 
experts’ reports and the attendance of witnesses.95 
English courts will not normally conduct their own researches into foreign law
96
. A party 
who wishes to rely on foreign law must generally plead the foreign rule and establish it by 
evidence.
97
 If the contents of foreign law are not established, either by evidence or by other 
means, the court will normally apply English law instead.
98
 However, the court may in 
some instances, where it has not had evidence of witnesses to assist it, be willing to 
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investigate foreign law, although it will normally do so only with the agreement of the 
parties
99
. 
It should be noted that in some cases English courts appear to have considered foreign law 
without it having been proved in evidence
100
, although English judges are under no 
obligation to ascertain and apply foreign law independently and normally are hesitant to do 
so.
101
 Hence, although foreign law is considered to be a fact, thus being primarily the 
responsibility of the parties to obtain the evidence of it, the courts seem to reserve the 
possibility of researching it independently in certain exceptional circumstances. The 
differences between the attitudes of English and French courts with respect to this matter 
seem rather remote in practice. 
 
b) Finland  
 
In Finland, the principle of jura novit curia finds statutory expression in the Finnish Code 
of Judicial Procedure (4/1734), under which parties are not required to present evidence on 
the contents of the law
102
.  
 
As regards foreign law, it is mainly for the parties to provide the court with evidence on its 
contents in cases where its application arises. Thus, if the court does not know the contents 
of the law of a foreign state, it “shall exhort the party to present evidence on the same”, 
unless it it specifically provided in a given case that the court is to obtain itself information 
on the contents of the foreign law applicable in the case. If in a given case foreign law 
should apply but no information is available on its contents, Finnish law is applied 
instead.
103
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c) France  
 
In France the principle of jura novit curia is considered as an integral part of French 
procedural law
104. Under the French Code of Civil Procedure, “the judge settles the dispute 
in accordance with the rules of law applicable thereto”105. The judge “must give or restore 
their proper legal definitions to the disputed facts and legal acts notwithstanding the 
denominations given by the parties” 106 . However, the judge “may not change the 
denomination or legal ground where the parties, pursuant to an express agreement and in 
the exercise of such rights that they may freely alienate, have bound him with legal 
definitions and legal arguments to which they intend to restrict their debate”107.  
 
The wording of the said provisions has been interpreted by the French highest civil court 
(“cour de cassation”) in M. Denis X. v. Carteret automobiles108, as meaning that although 
French judges have an obligation to give the disputed facts and legal acts their exact 
qualification without being bound by the denominations proposed by the parties, they 
merely have the authority to ex officio change the legal basis (“moyen de droit”) invoked 
by the parties
109
. The parties may, nevertheless, be involved in the ascertainment of the 
applicable law, as the judge has the power to invite the parties to furnish explanations on 
the legal arguments deemed necessary for the resolution of the dispute.
110
 
 
As regards the application of foreign law, it has now been settled by the cour de cassation 
that the judge is under a duty to ascertain and apply it. Foreign law was for a long time 
regarded as fact
111
, which the judge had the power to apply
112
 until the cour de cassation 
                                                        
104
 Mayer 1995, p. 178. 
105
 Article 12 (1) of the French Code of Civil Procedure ;”Le juge tranche le litige conformément aux règles 
de droit qui lui sont applicables.” [Translation from Legifrance]. 
106
 Article 12 (2) of the French Code of Civil Procedure ; ”Il droit donner ou restituer leur exacte 
qualification aux faits et actes litigieux sans s’arrêter à la dénomination que les parties en auraient 
proposés.” [Translation from Legifrance]. 
107
 Article 12 (3) of the French Code of Civil Procedure ; ”Toutefois, il ne peut changer la dénomination ou 
le fondement juridique lorsque les parties, en vertu d’un accord exprès et pour les droit dont elles ont la libre 
disposition, l’ont lié par les qualifications et points de droit auxquels elles entendent limiter le débat.” 
[Translation from Legifrance]. 
108 Cour de cassation (Ass. Plen.), case No. 564, 06-11.343, 21 December 2007. 
109
 ”Mais attendu que si, parmi les principles directeurs du procès, l’article 12 du nouveau code de 
procédure civile oblige le juge à donner ou restituer leur exacte qualification aux faits et actes litigieux 
invoqués par les parties au soutien de leurs prétentions, il ne lui fait pas obligation, sauf règles particulières, 
de changer la dénomination ou le fondement juridique de leurs demandes […]”. 
110
 Artcile 13 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. 
111
 Bisbal, Cass. 1er Ch. Civ., 12 May 1959. 
112
 Compagnie algérienne de crédit et de banque v. Chemouny, Cass. 1er Ch. Civ., 2 March 1960. 
 32 
reversed its approach and ruled that foreign law must be applied ex officio
113
. However, in 
1990 the cour de cassation redefined its position by ruling that the judge is not under a 
duty to apply foreign law ex officio apart from two situations: i) the judge is under a duty 
to apply ex officio mandatory provisions of law (i.e. in matters which the parties did not 
have free disposition of their rights) and ii) the judge is under a duty to ascertain and apply 
ex officio provisions arising from foreign treaties and conventions
114
. The current position 
was established 1999 when the cour de cassation held that judges are under a duty to 
ascertain and apply ex officio only mandatory provisions of foreign law
115
. As regards non-
mandatory provisions of foreign law, the judge has merely the authority to do so. 
 
Therefore, it the parties do not submit evidence of foreign law, the court may only apply 
French law in matters where the parties have a free choice of law, or if French choice of 
law rules do not provide for the applicability of some other law. Where the court is under a 
duty to apply foreign law or when it decides to apply it on its own motion, it may require 
the assistance of the parties or take judicial notice of foreign law or appoint an expert.
116
  
 
d) Switzerland 
 
Swiss law imposes an affirmative duty on the judge to independently ascertain and apply 
both national and foreign law. Under the Swiss Code of Civil Procedure of 19 December 
2008
117
 the courts apply the law ex officio
118
 within the limits of the parties’ claims119.  
 
Foreign law is also considered a question of law and not of fact. In Switzerland, 
international private law civil procedural issues are governed by the Swiss Federal Private 
International Law Act of 18 December 1987
120
 (hereinafter “the Swiss FPILA”), which 
provides expressly that judges must also ascertain foreign law ex officio
121
. However, the 
judge may ask for the parties to collaborate in the said task of the judge. Similarly to 
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Finnish law, if the applicable foreign law cannot be ascertained the courts shall instead 
apply Swiss law
122
.  
 
2.3.3 Ambiguous Utility of the Analogy  
 
As presented above, the principle of jura novit curia in respect of court proceedings 
concerns the ascertainment and application of both domestic and foreign law. When 
examining the principle’s application in arbitral proceedings, analogy from court 
proceedings proves out problematic. In order to consider the principle’s effect by analogy 
it must first be determined whether the approach of national procedure to domestic or to 
foreign law is relevant in order to successfully conduct a comparison with international 
arbitration.  
 
An international arbitrator often finds himself seated in a neutral country with the task of 
applying a law other than that of the legal system in which he himself is qualified.
123
 In 
other words, an international arbitral tribunal has no lex fori, as does a national court, and 
hence no foreign law either.
124
 Therefore, the question as to whether an arbitral tribunal is 
free to establish and assess the contents of the law arises with respect to any law as 
opposed to only foreign law, which is the situation with courts. Thus, the effect of the 
principle of jura novit curia would, in international arbitration, not cover merely foreign 
law but clearly any law.
125
  
 
Lew also supports the view under which an international arbitral tribunal has no 
nationality, hence no lex fori. The author argues that notwithstanding whether the 
arbitration is institutional or ad hoc, whether the rules applied in the proceedings are 
chosen expressly by the parties or applied by default, the manner in which the seat of the 
arbitration may have been fixed, i.e. by the parties or an institution, and who the arbitrators 
may be (nationality, origins, experience or expertise), the arbitral tribunal will not be 
ascribed a specific nationality.
126
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The different treatment of foreign law in national court proceedings is based on the fact 
that the national court has a forum law that it is deemed to know. It could thus be argued 
that an arbitral tribunal is always in the position of applying a foreign law, but as Isele 
points out this would entail that the exception in national jurisdictions would become the 
rule in international arbitration. On the other hand, since there are no lex fori and lex 
causae in international arbitration it could thus be argued, by corollary, that international 
arbitrators apply any law as if it were their own.
127
  
 
These differences do in fact strongly indicate towards a limited effect of the analogy from 
court proceedings in relation to the ascertainment and application of the substantive law in 
international arbitration. However, it should be noted that although it might be suggested 
that an international arbitral tribunal cannot be considered having a lex fori, it cannot be 
argued that the lex arbitri, i.e. the law of the seat of arbitration, would not have any impact 
on the arbitral proceedings. The significant impact of the applicable lex arbitri on the 
outcome of the arbitral proceedings shall be further examined in Chapter 4.  
                                                        
127
 Wetter 1985, p. 25. 
 35 
3. ARBITRATOR’S ROLE IN ASCERTAINING AND APPLYING THE 
LAW 
 
The jura novit curia principle has recently been a popular topic of discussion in legal 
literature and arbitration conferences inter alia. Its effect within international commercial 
arbitration has been much debated and the general opinion can roughly be divided between 
those who support its application, whether as imposing a duty or merely granting an 
authority, and those who do not welcome its application.  
 
This chapter shall describe the current situation of conflicting opinions in addition to 
examining the legal parameters of an arbitral tribunal’s flexibility in respect of its 
substantive case management powers. The aim is to provide a comprehensive summary of 
the debate on the issue and to come to a reasoned conclusion on whether an international 
arbitrator may have the obligation or the authority to ascertain and apply the law on its 
own initiative or whether the burden of proving the contents of the law lies entirely on the 
disputing parties and their respective counsel.  
 
3.1 Lack of Consensus in Legal Literature 
3.1.1 Arguments Against Application of the Principle  
 
The view shared by some legal authors that the jura novit curia principle has no room in 
international arbitration
128
 goes in line with the contractual theory of arbitration, as it does 
not recognize the possibility of a state mandating the application of the principle which is 
considered inadaptable with the consensual nature of arbitration. Objections to the 
application of the principle are often based on the differences between the nature of civil 
and arbitral proceedings. It has been argued that since the principle is a component of civil 
procedure and since civil procedure rules do not usually apply to international arbitration, 
arbitrators’ powers to take initiatives in matters of law cannot derive from the jura novit 
curia principle.
 129
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The ILA’s Committee reached a similar conclusion in the 2008 ILA Report. 
Recommendation 6 of the ILA Resolution No. 6/2008 states that arbitrators should not, in 
general, introduce legal issues that the parties have not raised. The 2008 ILA Report points 
out two main differences between international arbitral proceedings and national court 
proceedings that obstruct the possibility of applying the principle in international 
commercial arbitration. Firstly, the 2008 ILA Report highlights the differences between 
national legal systems themselves, as discussed above in Chapter 2.3.2, as an obstacle for 
the characterization of a universally applicable principle or a uniform practice that could be 
interpreted as guidance in relation to arbitral proceedings. Secondly, the fundamental 
differences between the position and the role of arbitrators compared to those of national 
and international judges also suggest towards limited relevancy of the analogy.
130
  
 
The mission of an arbitrator compared to that of a judge has been said to be much more 
ambiguous.
131
 The differences between the two roles relate inter alia to the fact that the 
judge has a duty of upholding the law resulting from being entrusted the task of rendering 
justice by the state. The judge owes a duty, as an organ of the state, to ensure that the law 
is applied correctly. An arbitrator, on the other hand, is appointed by the parties and is not 
part of a state’s legal system. The arbitrator owes a duty to the disputing parties to settle 
the dispute between them. Moreover, there exists no efficient mechanism, similar to the 
appeal procedure of national courts, to ensure the correct application of the law by an 
arbitral tribunal.
132
 Some authors argue that arbitrators have no legal duty to find the 
correct solution in a dispute, which is why they should settle the dispute solely based on 
arguments and evidence presented by the parties.
133
  
 
In addition, there are practical arguments against the application of the jura novit curia 
principle in international arbitral proceedings that relate to the fact that an arbitrator does 
not share the same resources as domestic judges do in conducting research on the 
applicable substantive law which could be argued to restrain arbitrators from 
independently ascertaining and applying the law. Moreover, the arbitral tribunal does not 
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have a forum law to fall back on if the contents of the applicable substantive law were 
unable to be ascertained as domestic courts do in practice as examined in Chapter 2.3.2.
134
  
 
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that international arbitration panels are often 
better placed and more experienced than courts of law in dealing with disputes where 
different laws are applicable as, especially as regards panels constituted of three 
arbitrators, the members might be of the states of which the laws are applicable.
135
 Thus, 
the parties are free to choose the most suitable arbitrators to settle their dispute and in case 
they do not wish for the arbitrators to decide as amiable compositeur, they are free to 
choose at least one person who knows the applicable substantive law well.   
 
Some authors also point out that independent research on the contents of the applicable law 
may increase costs, which in arbitral proceedings are borne by the parties and not by the 
state. Hence, it has been argued that arbitrators should refrain from conducting 
independent research and instead ought to base their decision on the law as presented by 
the parties during the arbitral proceedings. Landolt argues that arbitrator initiatives to 
obtain inter alia legal evidence will add to cost and time in the arbitration, unless it is clear 
from the beginning of the proceedings that arbitrators will bear the primary responsibility 
for the identification of evidence of the law. However, where the arbitrators have primary 
initiative on legal evidence, it is argued that the parties lose control of the costs of 
arbitration.
136
   
 
Moreover, allowing the application of the jura novit curia principle in international 
commercial arbitration has been argued to generally undermine the right of the parties to 
be “the masters of the arbitration”137. Thus, considering the importance of the principle of 
party autonomy in international commercial arbitration, it has been argued that any 
curtailment of the parties’ rights to be heard must be considered “repugnant”138, which is 
why the better view would be to leave it to the parties to determine the scope of the dispute 
both as to facts and as to law. On the other hand this argument cannot be justified as there 
is nothing preventing the parties from expressly agreeing on the conduct of arbitral 
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proceedings and thus limiting the arbitral tribunal’s authority to decide the case based 
entirely on the points of law raised and presented by the parties.
139
   
 
Some legal authors believe that in many specific instances arbitrators ought to demonstrate 
certain initiative in relation to ascertaining the contents of the applicable substantive law 
without, however, the need for the application of the jura novit curia principle. It is 
believed that a similar outcome may be reached with proactive case management. For 
instance, Hobér argues that the case management duty of an arbitrator can be regarded as a 
remedy against, or a counterweight to, the lack of the jura novit curia principle in 
international commercial arbitration.
140
 
 
3.1.2 Arguments Supporting Strict Application of the Principle 
 
The view according to which states may demand the application of the principle of jura 
novit curia by arbitrators follows the ideology of the jurisdictional theory, under which an 
arbitral tribunal derives its authority by delegation from the state. In addition, supporters of 
the hybrid theory may also lean towards advocating the strictest interpretation of the 
principle’s effect in international arbitration. The supporters of the view that the jura novit 
curia principle imposes a strict duty on arbitrators to ascertain and apply the law interpret 
the principle as it is applied in civil proceedings.  
 
Giovannini observes that courts seem to impose a real duty on arbitral tribunals to 
investigate independently the contents of the applicable substantive law.
141
 This is the case 
for example in Switzerland, where the Federal Tribunal has on various occasions held that 
the principle applies also in arbitration
142
.  
 
Arguments that the application of the principle is not necessary to ensure justice which are 
based on the fact e.g. in England the same result is achieved without relying on the 
principle in the context of ascertaining the contents of lex causae in civil proceedings, have 
been argued to be unconvincing. Isele points out that in the English system the correct 
                                                        
139
 Chainais 2010, pp. 18–19. 
140
 See e.g. Hobér 2011, p. 244. 
141
 Giovannini 2010, p. 500. 
142
 See e.g. DFT 4A_254/2010, 3 August 2010; DFT 4P_4/2007, 26 September 2007, consid. 4.1; and DFT 
4P.100/2003, consid. 5. 
 39 
application of the law is ensured by a duty on lawyers to present the entire law and not to 
mislead the judge
143
. No such duty exists in the context of arbitral proceedings.    
 
Moreover, it has been argued that the parties do not seem to attach great importance to the 
correct application of the law if they submit their dispute to arbitration disposing by 
corollary of a review on the merits. However, this view is arguably misconstrued since on 
the balance of interests, the finality of the award i.e. a speedy resolution of the parties’ 
commercial relationship, might in the end be of more importance to them.
144
 Moreover, in 
the situation where the parties do not expressly provide for the arbitral tribunal to base its 
decision on equitable grounds or decide the matter as amiable compositeur, and thus agree 
on the settlement of the dispute based on law, it is difficult to assimilate the argument that 
the law would not be required to be applied correctly, i.e. in its entirety. The arbitral 
tribunal’s duty to base the award in law shall be further discussed below in Chapter 3.2.1.  
 
Some authors argue that the principle should not be applicable in international arbitration 
because of the fact that parties often come from different legal backgrounds and do not 
necessarily expect arbitrators to take initiatives in the ascertainment of the applicable 
substantive law.
145
 However, Isele argues that in practice the application of the principle at 
the seat of arbitration would hardly come as a surprise, as parties are likely to be aware of 
the importance of the lex arbitri and hence are also usually informed about it.  
 
3.1.3 Arguments Supporting Partial Application of the Principle 
 
Some authors have taken a different approach in relation to the arbitral tribunal’s duty to 
ascertain and apply the law. For example, following El Kosheri’s way of thinking, an 
approach where the application of the principle would differ where the applicable rules are 
i) those of international law, ii) rules pertaining to a given domestic legal system and iii) 
where the issues that are supposed to be governed by usages of trade, i.e. transnational law. 
Following this view the principle would be considered fully applicable in relation to rules 
of public international law, e.g. the New York Convention of 1958. In these situations the 
arbitral tribunal would be under an obligation to consider, on its own initiative, the 
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interpretation and application of the said rules in the specific circumstances of the pending 
case. Where the applicable rules are those of a given domestic legal system, the principle 
loses a great deal of its significance, as the arbitral tribunal does not necessarily know the 
foreign law in question. The author finds it appropriate to shift the burden of education on 
the parties and seems to suggest that the arbitral tribunal would have the power but no duty 
to take initiative in appointing its own legal experts. As for the final group of rules, 
transnational rules, the principle jura novit curia would play an important rule on the basis 
that in practice most arbitrators in charge of international commercial cases are familiar 
with most issues concerning trade usages. Hence, in these situations arbitrators would have 
to educate themselves on the said issues.
146
  
 
Wetter has similarly suggested the principle jura novit curia to be fully applicable only in 
what the author calls the “ex officio domain”, i.e. in circumstances which involve a public 
interest or the interests of third parties that are not merely the concern of the disputing 
parties. Arbitrators would be required to act on their own motion and to assume total 
inquisitorial powers in this domain. Arbitrators would be obliged to raise questions ex 
officio and to decide jurisdictional aspects of the case on grounds, which neither party may 
have invoked and with reference to legal arguments, which neither party may have 
adduced.
147
    
  
Landolt also encourages arbitrators’ initiatives in three situations: i) in the application of 
mandatory norms, which engage fundamental state interests in which the arbitrator would 
be under a duty, ii) where the outcome of the arbitration will have a sufficiently immediate 
and substantial impact on interests other than those of the parties, in particular the public 
interest such as in the case of investment arbitrations, and iii) in certain limited 
circumstances where there exists an interest to the arbitrators themselves to take initiatives 
in relation to law, e.g. when it would be professionally embarrassing for the arbitral 
tribunal to be confined to choosing between the better of the parties’ submissions.148  
 
Sheppard takes a comparable approach finding that arbitral tribunals are not under a 
general duty to independently research the applicable substantive law and are entitled to 
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rely upon counsel representing the parties. Nevertheless, where a party is unfamiliar with 
the applicable law or e.g. is badly represented, the tribunal may direct the parties in the 
right direction or itself research the matter and ask for the parties’ comments. However, 
Sheppard argues that the onus to know or identify possible mandatory rules is greater on a 
tribunal comprising of one or more lawyers qualified in the applicable substantive law 
and/or the lex arbitri. Although the risk would in any case remain with the parties, arbitral 
tribunals are expected to conduct the proceedings and apply the law to the facts and thus to 
apply the law in its entirety correctly in order achieve an enforceable award.
149
  
 
As mentioned above in Chapter 3.1.1, the 2008 ILA Report came to the conclusion that the 
strict application of the jura novit curia principle has no room in international commercial 
arbitration concluding in its Recommendation 6 that arbitrators should not, in general, 
introduce legal issues that the parties have not raised. However, the ILA’s Committee took 
a more pragmatic approach by stating in Recommendation 13 that arbitrators would be 
required to conduct independent research on the applicable substantive law in exceptional 
situations where disputes implicate rules of public policy or other rules from which the 
parties may not derogate. Hence, although the ILA seems to take the view that arbitrators 
are not under a general duty to ascertain and apply the substantive applicable law in a 
dispute, they would be required to do so with respect to mandatory rules of public policy. 
Moreover, the ILA’s Committee concluded in Recommendation 15 that arbitrators may 
apply whatever law or rules they consider appropriate on a reasoned basis, after giving the 
parties notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard, in a situation where after diligent 
effort consistent with the ILA’s Recommendations the contents of the applicable law 
cannot be ascertained.  
 
Bensaude has pointed out the incoherence of the Committee’s approach with respect to its 
Recommendation 15. The author notes that although it is acceptable that arbitrators should 
wait until the end of the exchange of the parties’ written claims before inviting the parties 
to give further information on the applicable rules on a specific question since the parties 
have the burden of proof of the content of the applicable law as well, a prudent arbitral 
tribunal would not in fact do so. Bensaude argues that a diligent arbitrator would examine 
carefully the parties’ written presentations in sequence with the parties’ submissions and in 
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order to minimize cost and to be effective point out the question as soon as possible to the 
parties in order to vice versa refrain from reopening the debate after the conclusion of the 
audience in order to clarify the question in respect with the principle of contradiction.
150
 
 
However, although the arguments supporting partial application of the jura novit curia 
principle seem justified, the outcome of this approach is rather complex. Even if arbitral 
tribunals were duty-bound to apply merely e.g. mandatory provisions of the applicable 
substantive law, many of the problematic aspects affecting the application of the principle 
in international commercial arbitration stated in Chapter 3.1.1 above would remain 
unremedied. Due to the lack of unanimity in respect of the jura novit curia principle’s 
effect in international commercial arbitration, this thesis shall continue with examining 
whether there exists any concrete restrictions in the legal provisions relating to the conduct 
of arbitral proceedings limiting the authority of international arbitrators to conduct 
independent research on the applicable substantive law and to assess whether international 
arbitrators could possibly have the authority to ascertain and apply the law sua sponte.    
 
3.2  Examination of Rules on Arbitral Tribunal’s Conduct 
 
Although there is no general consensus on the possibility for an international arbitral 
tribunal to conduct its own independent research on the applicable substantive law sua 
sponte, it seems that even amongst supporters of the view under which the jura novit curia 
principle has in general no room in international commercial arbitration there exists some 
level of approval of the fact that arbitrators are not required, or necessarily even advised, to 
refrain themselves in an entirely passive role.
151
 However, the scope of an arbitral 
tribunal’s authority with respect to ascertaining and applying the law in a dispute has been 
discussed e.g. by Cordero-Moss in her recent publication. The provisions are scarce which 
is why they seem to leave the arbitral tribunal a great deal of freedom in respect of the sua 
sponte ascertainment and application of the law. 
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3.2.1 Duty to Base the Decision on Law 
 
Since the duty of an arbitrator is to comply with the law
152
, assessing the contents of the 
applicable substantive law can be argued as constituting an essential part of an arbitrator’s 
mandate. This argument in favor of the authority of an arbitrator to ascertain and apply the 
applicable substantive law sua sponte is supported by the fact that the duty of the arbitral 
tribunal to give its ruling based on law is expressly stated in numerous arbitration rules and 
laws. For example, article 28 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law provides that  
 
”(1) [t]he arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with such 
rules of law as are chosen by the parties as applicable to the substance of the 
dispute. […] 
(2) Failing any designation by the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the 
law determined by the conflict of law rules which it considers applicable.  
(3) The arbitral tribunal shall decide ex aequo et bono or as amiable 
compositeur only if the parties have expressly authorized it to do so.” 
 
Thus, under the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law an arbitral tribunal must base its decision in 
law unless expressly otherwise instructed by the parties. Under the wording of the 
provision, the possibility of rendering an award based in equity can hence be interpreted as 
constituting an exception to the principal rule of basing the decision on rules of law chosen 
primarily by the parties, or in the lack of such choice, on rules of law, which the arbitral 
tribunal considers applicable. Following the example set out by the 1985 UNCITRAL 
Model Law, a similar approach has been taken by various states in their respective national 
arbitration laws as well
153
. A similar premise has, in addition, been adopted in some 
transnational arbitration rules
154
 as well as in the arbitration rules of most international 
arbitral institutions
155
.   
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The early conception of arbitration associated the procedure with equity. The nature of 
arbitration has since developed into a new kind, based on law, as part of which the 
arbitrator is supposed to apply the rules of law laid down by the legislator.
156
 
Consequently, it can be argued that nowadays the generally applicable approach is that an 
arbitral tribunal has the duty to apply the contents of the law either expressly chosen by the 
parties or considered as appropriate by the tribunal itself in rendering its award. By 
corollary, the arbitral tribunal can be considered as having an obligation to ensure that the 
contents of the applicable substantive law are correctly ascertained.  
 
This position is supported by Wobeser, who argues that the role of arbitrators in 
ascertaining the contents of the applicable substantive law should be examined in the light 
of their mandate towards the parties, i.e. the task to apply the law, which entails that 
arbitrators must establish the contents of the applicable law even when it has not been 
brought forward by the parties.
157
 Other authors supporting this position include Chainais, 
who is of the opinion that the arbitral tribunal’s liberty of determining the applicable 
substantive law in a dispute entails a duty resulting from the mission conferred upon it by 
the parties; the arbitral tribunal will have to decide the dispute based on law.
158
 
 
Some legal authors have suggested that the application of the principle of jura novit curia 
would follow directly from the duty to apply the law.
159
 It could be argued that since an 
arbitral tribunal is under the duty to base its decision either on the law chosen by the 
parties, or that which it itself finds most suitable, it would follow that if the parties fail to 
present all relevant points of the applicable substantive law and the arbitral tribunal would 
proceed with basing its decision merely on the incomplete points of law invoked by the 
parties, its role would resemble that of an amiable compositeur. In fact, the arbitral tribunal 
would in this case base its decision on equitable grounds and would thus be in breach of its 
duty to base the arbitral award on law.  
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3.2.2 Possibility of Independently Evaluating Parties’ Pleadings 
 
Most arbitration laws and rules provide that once the arbitral jurisdiction is established by 
the arbitral agreement, a party may not prevent an arbitral proceeding and the award from 
being rendered by failing to contribute to the arbitral proceedings.
160
 Hence arbitrators are 
not required to receive pleadings from all parties to the dispute in order to proceed with the 
arbitration. Arbitrators are thus given the power to proceed with the international 
arbitration proceedings even in a situation of party default, which could also be interpreted 
as a duty of the arbitral tribunal to independently evaluate the pleadings of the participating 
party.
161
   
 
Although most arbitration laws and rules are silent on the arbitral tribunal’s conduct in a 
situation where one party fails to appear to the arbitral proceedings, it has been argued in a 
commentary on article 21(2) of the old ICC Arbitration Rules amended in 1998
162
 that, as a 
widely accepted principle in international arbitration, failure by one party to appear should 
not normally be deemed to constitute an admission of the claims and allegations made by 
the other party.
163
 Cordero-Moss has interpreted this as assuming that an arbitral tribunal 
has the power to proceed to an independent evaluation where one party fails to appear to 
the proceedings and argues that e.g. with respect to institutional arbitration, if the tribunal 
would blindly accept the pleadings of the participating party, this would not seem to 
comply with the expectations of justice connected with the institute of arbitration.
164
  
 
Based on the above grounds it could thus be argued that an arbitral tribunal would seem to 
be allowed a rather wide leeway in the independent evaluation of the parties’ claims and 
allegations with respect to circumstances described above. What remains unclear is the 
scope of the arbitral tribunal’s power of independent evaluation.    
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3.2.3 Possibility of Requesting Additional Information 
 
Many arbitration laws and rules permit arbitrators to exercise rather wide substantive case 
management powers. Arbitrators may e.g. request that the parties present additional 
documentation
165
 for the purpose of clarification and to avoid uncertainties in 
understanding the parties’ claims. In addition, arbitrators may be allowed to appoint 
experts
166
 or even to independently conduct inspections
167
 in order to clarify matters that 
the parties have not managed to explain themselves. This possibility of requesting 
additional clarifications constitutes a part of an arbitral tribunal’s substantive case 
management powers. An arbitral tribunal’s task of ensuring the proper understanding of 
the parties’ positions is important, since the resulting arbitral award may be set aside if the 
arbitrators rule ultra or extra petita as we shall see below in Chapter 4.2.  
 
It should be noted that the said possibility of requesting additional information is not 
limited merely to situations where one party fails to appear to the arbitral proceedings. It 
applies in general even if both parties participate actively in the presentation of their 
respective cases. Cordero-Moss finds that this possibility may be used to introduce new 
elements that were not at all or not sufficiently pleaded by the parties, although she points 
out that it remains unclear how far a tribunal may go in introducing these new elements.
168
 
In other words it remains unclear whether the mentioned provisions are to be interpreted as 
allowing an arbitral tribunal to ask for additional documentation and clarifications in order 
to better understand the claims and allegations made by the parties or whether they would 
allow a tribunal to apply sources that the parties have not invoked for example. 
 
3.3  Consolidating the Principle Into International Arbitration 
 
On the above-mentioned basis, it could be argued that an arbitral tribunal would at least 
not be prevented from independently ascertaining and applying the applicable substantive 
law in situations where the parties’ presentations do not suffice to clarify their claims and 
allegations. Moreover, some authors have suggested that the tendency of case law in 
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various jurisdictions has also recently shifted towards accepting that international 
arbitrators may indeed ascertain and apply the applicable substantive law on their own 
initiative
169
.  
 
3.3.1 Proposals for Adapting the Principle with the Characteristics of 
Arbitration 
 
Various legal authors have argued that the principle of jura novit curia is capable of being 
adapted into international commercial arbitration.
170
 This position goes in line with the 
hybrid theory of arbitration, as it contains elements of both the contractual and the 
jurisdictional theory. The said authors seem to agree that the primary duty of ascertaining 
the contents of the applicable substantive law would be on the parties
171
 or at least that the 
burden of education ought to be shared between the parties and the arbitral tribunal
172
.  
 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that the power of arbitrators to introduce sua sponte new 
issues of law constitutes “a facet of their jurisdictional mission” and should, therefore, not 
even be questioned.
173
 Hence, the proposed view is that the freedom of arbitrators to 
undertake an active role in the management of the arbitral proceedings, as discussed above 
in Chapters 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, would justify a certain level of discretion to introduce new 
issues of law. However, an arbitral tribunal would naturally be required to assess the 
appropriateness of the use of such discretion on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The imposition of a strict duty to ascertain and apply the law does not take into account 
arbitration’s unique features. Isele argues that the two main arguments against a strict duty 
to ascertain and apply the law sua sponte do not apply in the context of a mandatory 
authority. The fact that the expertise and knowledge of arbitrators varies from arbitration to 
arbitration would not impose great difficulty or problems where arbitrators would have 
merely an authority to apply the law sua sponte. The arbitral tribunal would thus be able to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether it needs to do further research or not. Also, the 
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issue relating to the control on the merits would not cause problems either since the failure 
to conduct independent research would not require sanctioning.
174
  
 
Moreover, a subtler interpretation of the principle under which arbitrators would have the 
authority to ascertain the contents of the applicable substantive law independently would 
enable arbitrators to ensure equality before the law in that the parties would not be able to 
evade mandatory provisions and policies. The proposals for partial application of the jura 
novit curia principle (see Chapter 3.1.2.2 above) would lead to the obligation of an arbitral 
tribunal to conduct research on the contents of the substantive law and to identify and 
apply mandatory provisions while ignoring any other relevant provisions that the tribunal 
might obtain throughout such research.
175
  
 
This view seems to be justifiable, as it appears that many jurisdictions have established that 
the principle of jura novit curia applies also in arbitration. This is the position for example 
in Switzerland and Finland where the highest civil courts of both jurisdictions have 
established that the principle does indeed have an effect in arbitration and more 
specifically with respect to international arbitral proceedings
176
.  
 
In addition, section 34 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 would also suggest towards a 
more subtle effect of the principle in international arbitration, as the wording of the 
provision empowers an arbitral tribunal to explore legal issues without imposing any legal 
duties on arbitrators.
177
 The section also highlights the inaccuracy of arguments against 
application of the principle on the ground of divergences between common law and civil 
law systems and the fact that parties from jurisdictions that do not recognize the principle 
could be surprised by the outcome of the arbitration. Cordero-Moss emphasizes that the 
arbitration law that mostly represents the common law systems, i.e. the English Arbitration 
Act, does not reflect an adversarial approach in the strict sense since e.g. an arbitral 
tribunal is not bound by the arguments made by the parties when developing its 
reasoning
178
. Moreover, Lord Justice Steyn has argued that arbitrators applying English 
arbitration legislation should not be bound by the technical rules of evidence or to follow 
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the adversarial procedures of the courts.
179
 Hence, on this basis, it could be argued that the 
common law tradition of English judges adopting a passive role in court proceedings 
would not constitute an objection to English arbitrators adopting a more active role in 
arbitral proceedings.  
 
3.3.2 Recent Tendencies in Case Law Suggesting Approval of the Principle 
in International Arbitration 
 
 
In addition, recent case law seems to suggest that a consensus is forming in various 
jurisdictions allowing arbitrators the possibility to base their decision on matters of law not 
invoked by the parties.  
 
For example, the effect of the jura novit curia principle in arbitration has constantly been 
confirmed by the courts in Switzerland. The Swiss Federal Tribunal held in the so-called 
Westland Helicopters case that as long as the arbitral tribunal’s conclusions are reasoned in 
a sufficient manner, arbitrators are not bound by the arguments invoked by the parties in 
virtue of the jura novit curia principle.
180
 This principle has been upheld by recent case 
law as well
181
. Under Swiss law arbitral tribunals have, in accordance with the jura novit 
curia principle, the authority to base their findings in legal principles not invoked by the 
parties.
182
  
 
The Finnish Supreme Court has also had the opportunity of expressly acknowledging the 
application of the jura novit curia principle in arbitral proceedings in the so-called Werfen 
case
183
 where it held that an arbitral tribunal is not bound by the legal views presented by 
the parties. This statement has been considered as an express recognition by the Supreme 
Court of the principle jura novit curia as a prevailing principle also in arbitral 
proceedings.
184
  
 
                                                        
179
 Steyn 1994, pp. 7–9. 
180
 Westland Helicopters Ltd. v. The Arab British Helicopter Company (ABH) and Arbitral Tribunal, case 
No. DFT 120 II 172 of 19 April 1994, consid. 3.a). 
181
 DFT 4A_464/2009 of 15 February 2010, consid. 4.1; DFT 4A_254/2010 of 3 August 2010, consid. 3.1; 
and DFT 4A_108/2009 of 9 June 2009, consid. 2.1. 
182
 Geisinger and Mazuranic 2013, p. 247. 
183
 KKO 2008:77, case No. 1517 of 2 July 2008. 
184
 Waselius and Jussila 2011, p. 723. 
 50 
Moreover, this trend has been said to be specific to certain common law countries as 
well
185
. For example, in the context of an English rent review arbitration, Lawrence Collins 
J rejected in Warborough Investments Ltd. v. S Robinson & Sons (Holdings) Ltd.
186
 the 
landlord’s argument that the arbitrator had supplied evidence or inferred it for himself and 
considered that the arbitrator could not be regarded as having acted in breach of his general 
duty under section 33 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act in ”extracting an alternative case 
from the submissions”. In addition, the said position was cited in ABB AG v. Hochtief 
Airport GmbH, Athens International Airport S.A.
187
 in the judgment of Tomlinson J.  
 
Even if international arbitrators would thus seem to be authorized to conduct independent 
research on the applicable substantive law and base their decision on those findings, what 
remains unclear is the scope of the said authority and freedom. As already mentioned, the 
choice of the place of arbitration has a significant impact on the validity of the arbitral 
award. In practice, the requirements for a valid arbitral award also set the bounds to the 
active role of an arbitrator in ascertaining and applying the substantive law sua sponte. 
However, before continuing with a more detailed examination of the current legal situation 
in the chosen European countries, in the following Chapter 4, the proposed limits to the 
possibility of applying the jura novit curia principle in international commercial arbitration 
shall be examined below.  
 
3.3.3 Proposed Limits to the Application of the Principle  
 
The above chapters have presented the proposal of a consolidated principle of jura novit 
curia in international arbitration and provided examples from recent case law suggesting 
that a common approach could be detectable both in common law and civil law 
jurisdictions. The application of the principle requires, however, some adjustments. Firstly, 
as established in the above Chapter 3.3.1, an arbitral tribunal should not be regarded as 
being under a positive duty to ascertain the correct application of the applicable substantive 
law but rather that arbitrators should enjoy the authority to adopt independent legal 
reasoning where deemed necessary.
188
 Therefore, one of the suggested limits to the 
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application of the jura novit curia principle in international commercial arbitration is that 
an arbitral tribunal cannot be sanctioned if it were to decide not to make use of its authority 
to ascertain and apply the applicable substantive law sua sponte.  
 
Secondly, it is suggested that the educative burden should be shared between the parties 
and the arbitral tribunal. A shared burden is considered more appropriate, because 
imposing an obligation to ascertain and apply the law would impose an onerous burden 
upon the tribunal, it would also increase costs which may flow on to the parties and lastly, 
not all arbitrators are necessarily familiar with the invoked substantive law. Thus, even if 
an arbitral tribunal were to have the authority to ascertain and apply the law sua sponte in 
accordance with the principle of jura novit curia, the parties would not be entirely 
dismissed of having a certain role with respect to the ascertainment of the applicable 
substantive law. A party that relies entirely on the arbitrators to establish the law and draw 
the proper conclusions runs risks in practice. Hence, to avoid those risks the burden of 
education should be divided between the disputing parties and the arbitral tribunal.
189
  
 
Chainais notes that in accordance with good practice, it would be most appropriate that the 
disputing parties were the ones to invoke the applicable substantive legal provisions and 
that the arbitral tribunal would encourage them to act so from the beginning of the arbitral 
proceedings. In addition, the author highlights that the principle would naturally also be 
restricted by any express agreement of the disputing parties in limiting the arbitral 
tribunal’s powers to the arguments and claims invoked by the parties. In other words, 
arbitrators are limited by their mandate.
190
 In these circumstances the authority of an 
arbitral tribunal to ascertain and apply the law sua sponte would be restricted by the 
express agreement of the parties in accordance with the principle of party autonomy.  
 
Finally, the scope of the principle in international commercial arbitration should be limited 
by the factual submissions of the parties.
191
 This is a long established rule and it is for 
example expressly stated in article 27(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules under which 
”[e]ach party shall have the burden of proving the facts relied on to support its claim or 
defense”. The parties should have the sole responsibility to present the facts of their 
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dispute, since they are in a better and more appropriate position to do so. The arbitral 
tribunal would, therefore, be merely authorized to ascertain and apply questions of law sua 
sponte and leave matters of fact to be established and proved by the disputing parties 
themselves.    
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4. SCOPE OF AN ARBITRATOR’S FREEDOM IN ASCERTAINING 
AND APPLYING THE LAW 
 
Although opinions may differ with respect to the possibility of applying the jura novit 
curia principle in international commercial arbitration, in practice the scope of an 
arbitrator’s freedom in ascertaining and applying the substantive law sua sponte is 
ultimately defined by the prerequisites for an arbitral award’s validity.  When ascertaining 
and applying the law sua sponte international arbitrators must, in order to render a final 
arbitral award, take into account certain fundamental rights of and duties owed to the 
disputing parties, namely i) the right to be heard in an adversarial procedure, ii) the equal 
treatment of the parties, and iii) the prohibition of an arbitral tribunal to exceed its mandate 
(”ne ultra petita partium”).192 The aim of this chapter is to further examine these duties of 
an arbitrator and to evaluate the standards of validity of an arbitral award in order to 
attempt to define the scope of an arbitrator’s freedom to conduct independent research on 
the applicable substantive law without jeopardizing the finality of the award. 
 
4.1  Duty to Render a Valid Arbitral Award  
 
Settling the dispute between the parties, which by corollary entails a duty to render a valid 
award, can be held as the main contractual duty of an arbitral tribunal. Hence, the ultimate 
limits of the authority of international arbitrators to ascertain and apply the law sua sponte 
may be deduced from the approach of national courts in relation to the validity of arbitral 
awards. The importance of national arbitration laws is highlighted in this area, since courts 
apply their own law when they determine whether an arbitral award is valid or not.
193
  
 
4.1.1 Legal Basis of Examination 
  
One of the main advantages of international arbitration is the fact that it leads to a final 
decision binding the disputing parties and that arbitral awards may be widely enforced 
nationally as well as internationally. The final and binding effect of the arbitral award also 
sets arbitration apart from other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as 
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mediation which leads to the mediator giving a recommendation that the disputing parties 
may either accept or refuse.
194
 International arbitrators must, therefore, ensure that 
ascertaining and applying the law sua sponte will not have a negative effect on the validity 
of the arbitral award, i.e. its finality.  
 
It should be noted that the obligation to render a valid arbitral award does not necessarily 
entail an obligation to render an enforceable award since the arbitrator cannot be required 
to know in which country the award shall be enforced and the said country’s requirements 
for enforcement. It will extend to an obligation to render an enforceable award only if the 
arbitrator has expressly contracted to do so with the parties.
195
 Therefore, for the purposes 
of this thesis, the presumption shall be that there is no such express agreement, and 
consequently, the examination of the limits of the jura novit curia principle shall be 
restricted to the assessment of case law relating to setting aside arbitral awards on 
invalidity grounds. 
 
4.1.2 Prerequisites for the Validity of an Arbitral Award 
 
The grounds for setting aside arbitral awards have been subject to efforts of harmonization 
inter alia with the introduction of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law.
196
 Article 34 of the 
Model Law provides an exhaustive list of the grounds under which national courts may set 
aside an arbitral award upon the request of a disputing party. It should be noted that, as 
these exclusive grounds for setting aside arbitral awards are considered as exceptions to the 
rule that an arbitral award is final, they tend to be construed narrowly.
197
 Various 
jurisdictions have accordingly established that challenges for setting aside an award cannot 
be considered as appeal proceedings in which evidence would be re-evaluated and the 
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correctness of the arbitral tribunal’s decision on the merits could be examined.198 This is 
assumed to apply in principle to issues of law in addition to issues of fact.
199
 For example 
Swiss courts have expressly stated that an award will not be set aside on the ground that it 
has been rendered in clear violation of rules of law, due to the fact that Swiss courts do not 
wish to grant the parties a possibility of having a second opportunity to re-argue the merits 
of a case before the court.
200
 The tendency to take a restrictive approach in interfering with 
decisions of arbitral tribunals emphasizing the exceptional character of the remedy is also 
common in other civil law jurisdictions.
201
  
 
Common law jurisdictions such as England
202
 on the other hand continue to provide for the 
annulment of international arbitral awards based upon such review
203
. However, review on 
the merits is usually restricted and available only to correct egregious legal errors. The 
possibility of review applies only to questions of English law, excluding thus non-English 
law questions and questions of fact, and even then only to issues of English law that are of 
public significance or where the award is obviously wrong.
204
 Moreover, the House of 
Lords has highlighted in the Lesotho Highlands case
205
 that the 1996 English Arbitration 
Act does not permit a challenge on the ground that the arbitral tribunal arrived at a wrong 
conclusion as a matter of law or fact. As noted by Lord Steyn, the aim of English courts is 
to promote “one-stop adjudication”.  
 
Thus, arbitrators’ initiatives on legal evidence are not generally subject to an enforceable 
obligation to be exercised properly. Consequently, the sua sponte ascertainment and 
application of the law by international arbitrators cannot be impugned on the basis of e.g. 
violation of the principle of proportionality or that the arbitral tribunal has adverted to 
irrelevant factors inter alia.
206
 Consequently, the validity of an international arbitral award 
cannot generally be said to depend on the manner in which an arbitral tribunal interprets 
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and applies the law, since most jurisdictions do not recognize the possibility of a review on 
the merits of arbitral awards. 
 
4.1.3 Judicial Control on the Validity of an Arbitral Award 
 
The main prerequisites for the validity of an arbitral award can thus be said to relate to the 
formal requirements of the conduct of arbitral proceedings. In order for arbitrators to fulfill 
their fundamental duty of settling the dispute between the parties, they must respect certain 
procedural requirements when rendering the award, including inter alia treating the parties 
equally, providing the parties with an opportunity to present their case, conducting the 
arbitral proceedings efficiently and expediently, completing their mandate and not 
exceeding it, as well as acting under a general duty of care throughout the arbitral 
procedure.
207
  
 
Taking into account the fact that courts do not generally have the jurisdiction to review 
arbitral awards in their merits, the remedies that appear most relevant in determining the 
scope of the jura novit curia principle in international arbitration are the remedies provided 
for excess of power and violation of due process.
208
 In addition, arbitrators are confined to 
the terms of the arbitration agreement, the factual submissions and the request for relief of 
the parties. If the arbitral tribunal goes beyond these boundaries, the award will be open to 
challenge in many jurisdictions. Procedural irregularities may also open the arbitral award 
to challenge, if they seriously affect the respect of due process.  
 
The validity of an arbitral award, and ultimately the possibility of applying the jura novit 
curia principle in international commercial arbitration, is regulated by the national 
arbitration laws of the place of the arbitration. Domestic courts will, therefore, apply their 
own law when they determine whether an award is valid or not. Accordingly, the following 
examination of case law shall be conducted with a specific focus on the existing legislation 
and case law of the so-called major places of arbitration in Europe, as discussed above in 
the introductory Chapter 1.3.   
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4.2  Duty Not to Exceed Mandate – Ne Ultra Petita 
 
Some authors have argued that the principle of jura novit curia collides with the maxim ne 
ultra petita, because the possibility of an arbitrator to ascertain and apply the law sua 
sponte would consequently lead to the arbitrator exceeding his mandate on the basis that 
going beyond the parties’ submissions would necessarily imply going against the principle 
of party autonomy. However, the principles do coexist and both have an effect on the 
conduct of arbitral proceedings. They complement each other insofar as the maxim ne 
ultra petita merely sets the parameters of operation for the jura novit curia principle.
209
 
 
Since arbitrators derive their authority from the arbitration agreement between the 
disputing parties, they must respect the boundaries set therein. Awarding remedies or 
sanctioning a party in a manner not recognized by the arbitration agreement or by law may 
constitute non-compliance of the arbitral tribunal’s mandate and jeopardize the finality of 
the arbitral award.
210
  
 
4.2.1 General Features – Applicable Provisions 
 
Under article 34(2)(a)(iii) of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law an arbitral award may be 
set aside by the court if the party making the application furnishes proof that the award 
deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission 
to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration. The provision deals with two situations: i) where the arbitral tribunal has 
rendered a decision outside its jurisdiction or without jurisdiction (”extra petita”) and ii) 
where the arbitral tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction (”ultra petita”). Although most 
countries have based their national arbitration laws on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, 
the wording of the invalidity ground for excess of power varies from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  
Some domestic provisions are formulated rather broadly. For example section 41(1)(1) of 
the Finnish Arbitration Act provides that an arbitral award may be set aside by the court 
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upon request of a party if “the arbitral tribunal has exceeded its authority”. In addition, 
article 1520(3) of the French Code of Civil Procedure has also been drafted in a general 
nature providing that the failure of the arbitral tribunal to comply with “the terms of the 
mission conferred upon it” opens the award for challenge. Were these provisions 
interpreted broadly, the failure of the arbitral tribunal to comply with “its authority” could 
enable a very broad use of the ground for challenge for parties dissatisfied with the 
outcome of the arbitral tribunal’s decision. Moreover, the “terms of the mission conferred 
upon it” could in fact include any rule governing the conduct of arbitral proceedings or 
even any of the rules governing the merits of the case
211
.  
 
On the other hand, other domestic provisions have been formulated in a more restrictive 
manner, such as article 190(2) of the Swiss FPILA under which an award may be set aside 
if “the arbitral tribunal ruled beyond the claims submitted to it, or failed to decide one of 
the claims submitted to it”. The circumstances of excess of power under Swiss law are thus 
clearly restricted to situations where the arbitral tribunal has granted relief beyond what the 
disputing parties have sought or where the tribunal has failed to adjudicate certain 
claims
212
. Moreover, section 68 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act also provides for the 
challenge of awards on ground of “serious irregularity”. Under section 68(2)(b) of the Act, 
an arbitral award is open to challenge where a tribunal has exceeded its powers in 
situations where this “has caused or will cause substantial injustice to the applicant”. 
Hence, English arbitration law seems to have adopted a much more restrictive wording 
compared to the other mentioned jurisdictions in listing further qualitative prerequisites for 
a successful challenge of an arbitral award based on the exhaustive list of invalidity 
grounds provided under section 68 of the Act. 
 
4.2.2 Restrictive Interpretation as Common Approach 
 
Although the wording of the above-mentioned provisions in the presented jurisdictions 
may vary, national courts seem to have adopted a common approach in relation to the 
interpretation of the invalidity ground for excess of power. The courts in each jurisdiction 
seem to have adopted a narrow view in relation to the scope of the possibility to challenge 
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an award on the ground that the arbitral tribunal has exceeded its mandate. The 
predominant tendency in arbitration is to treat only awards which go beyond the relief 
sought by the parties as ultra petita.
213
  
 
a) England  
 
English courts seem reluctant to intervene and to set aside or remit arbitral awards based 
on alleged procedural irregularity. Tuckey J. stated in Egmatra AG v. Marco Trading
214
 
that section 68 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act is designated to “only be invoked in 
cases where something has gone so wrong that justice calls out for the matter to be 
corrected”. Similarly, Peter Coulson Q.C. emphasized in Newfield Construction Ltd v. 
Tomlinson
215
 that section 68 is “of limited applicability and only available in extreme cases 
where justice requires court action”.  
 
The said restrictive approach was followed by the House of Lords in the Lesotho 
Highlands case
216
. The judgment has been said to be a key case for any party considering 
bringing a challenge for “serious irregularity” as it goes wider than the issue in dispute, 
which was whether an error of law could amount to excess of power under section 68(2)(b) 
of the Act. The case emphasized the increasing recognition of English courts of the fact 
that they should interfere sparingly in arbitral proceedings.
217
 Lord Steyn noted inter alia 
that a major purpose of the amendments made to the 1996 English Arbitration Act was to 
reduce drastically the extent of intervention of the courts in the arbitral process
218
. In order 
to decide whether section 68(2)(b) is engaged, Lord Steyn emphasized it necessary to 
“focus intensely on the particular power under an arbitration agreement, the terms of 
reference, or the Act which is involved, judged in all the circumstances of the case”.219  
 
The test for remitting or setting aside arbitral awards under English law has been described 
as being “two-pronged” and as having a high threshold. The conduct complained about 
must have been a “serious irregularity” in addition to giving rise to a “substantial 
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injustice”. Thus, English law seems to operate a rather high threshold to applications to set 
aside or remit an arbitral award where procedural irregularity is relied upon and the powers 
under section 68 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act will be invoked only in exceptional 
circumstances.
220
 In addition, if a party considers that a serious irregularity has occurred 
which has caused it substantial injustice, that party should take steps to resolve the issue as 
soon as possible, if necessary with the arbitral tribunal itself.
221
  
 
b) Finland  
 
The position of Finnish courts on setting aside arbitral awards for excess of mandate has 
been clarified by the decision of the Finnish Supreme Court in Werfen Austria GmbH v. 
Polar Electro Europe B.V.
222
. Previous case law was limited to Court of Appeal cases 
having a general tendency of dismissing requests for setting aside arbitral awards on the 
basis of section 41(1)(1) of the Finnish Arbitration Act.
223
  
 
The Werfen case concerned a distribution agreement between an Austrian company and a 
Swiss branch of a Finnish company. The Finnish Supreme Court was faced with a 
challenge of an arbitral award inter alia on the ground that the arbitrators had exceeded 
their authority. In the underlying arbitral proceedings the claimant, Werfen Austria, had 
claimed indemnity for the termination of a distribution agreement. However, the arbitral 
tribunal decided to adjust the distribution agreement on the basis of section 36 of the 
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Finnish Contracts Act (228/1929)
 224 
which had not been invoked by the parties during the 
arbitral proceedings.  
 
The Supreme Court held by a 3–2 majority vote that the arbitral tribunal had merely 
interpreted and adjusted the distribution agreement when it decided to award the claimant 
indemnity corresponding to the lost revenues that the claimant had given evidence of 
having suffered during the validity of the agreement. In doing so, the Supreme Court found 
that the arbitral tribunal had not awarded anything in excess of that claimed in the 
arbitration and thus had not based its award on a fact which the claimant had not invoked. 
The rather liberal position of the Supreme Court seems to grant arbitral tribunals with a 
rather wide discretion in assessing the grounds for the parties’ claims.225 
 
c) France  
 
The French courts have similarly taken a narrow view in the application of the invalidity 
ground for excess of mandate emphasizing that the recourse is not to enable the courts “to 
review the substantive aspects of the award” but simply “to verify, without having to rule 
on whether the arbitrators’ decision was well-founded, that they complied with their 
mandate with regard to the contested aspects of their award”226. French courts are thus able 
to set aside an arbitral award where the arbitrators have not observed the limits of the 
claims raised by the parties or where the arbitrators have otherwise exceeded the powers 
that the parties have expressly conferred upon them.
227
  
 
The fact that an arbitral tribunal may have based its decision on allegations or arguments 
which were not put forward by the parties will not amount to a failure to comply with its 
mandate. French courts have established that arbitrators exceed their mandate only where 
they grant one of the parties more than it actually sought in its claims. For example, the 
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Paris Court of Appeal has set aside part of an award on the basis that it ordered interest to 
be accrued from a date earlier than the date requested by the party
228
. Moreover, the Paris 
Court of Appeal has set aside an award where the arbitral tribunal reached a decision on 
the property rights of a party in a situation where the party’s claims concerned only a 
company’s by-laws229.    
 
d) Switzerland 
 
Under Swiss law arbitrators have an obligation to ascertain and apply the law sua 
sponte.
230
 It has been established that the parties’ prayers for relief determine the 
parameters within which an arbitral tribunal must adjudicate.
231
 Article 190(2) of the Swiss 
FPILA does not constitute a ground for setting aside an arbitral award where an arbitral 
tribunal grants relief for legal reasons different from those relied upon by the claimant, 
because an arbitral tribunal is not bound by the legal characterizations of the parties.
232
  
 
Thus, according to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, an arbitral tribunal does not act ultra or 
extra petita if it takes into consideration means of law not invoked by the parties as this 
would merely amount to a requalification of the facts of the case.
233
 The Federal Tribunal 
took a similar approach in Bank Saint Petersburg PLC v. ATA Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret 
Ltd.
234
 where it held that the arbitral tribunal had not exceeded its mandate in awarding 
damages for breach of contract when the claimant had in fact requested indemnification for 
non-compliance with the guarantee agreement of the parties.  
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The Federal Tribunal gave examples of situations where an arbitrator will not have acted 
extra or ultra petita in Compagnie Maritime Belge v. N.V. Distrigas
235
. The Federal 
Tribunal stated that there will not be excess of power e.g. in a situation where the total 
amount awarded does not exceed the amount of the requested relief, even if the elements 
of the claims were appreciated distinctively from that presented by the parties. The Federal 
Tribunal held that arbitrators are not bound by the arguments invoked by the disputing 
parties because of the principle of jura novit curia, which is also applicable in arbitration. 
Arbitrators are thus free to apply means not invoked by the parties because this will not 
amount to a new or different request for relief but merely a new qualification of the 
applicable facts. Arbitrators are, nevertheless, bound by the object and the amount of the 
conclusions submitted to them, particularly where a party has determined or limited its 
claims in the actual conclusions.  
 
4.2.3 Common Reluctance to Set Aside Arbitral Awards for Excess of 
Mandate 
 
The courts in all of the discussed jurisdictions seem to share a common reluctance to 
setting arbitral awards aside solely on the ground that the arbitral tribunal has exceeded its 
mandate. It could be thus argued that there exists a strong presumption that, provided that 
the originally requested relief covers the recharacterization of the claim, the courts will not 
set aside an arbitral award on the basis that the arbitral tribunal would have violated the 
principle of ne ultra petita.  
 
Some courts seem to show an inclination towards allowing arbitral tribunals rather 
extensive freedom in establishing the scope of the parties’ claims. For example, the Finnish 
Supreme Court seems to have adopted a liberal approach in relation to the scope of arbitral 
tribunals’ discretion to recharacterize claims. Under Finnish law the possibilities for 
adjusting business contracts between equally armed professionals are rare and very 
restricted.
236
 On this basis it has been argued that in a dispute between professional parties, 
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adjustment without a claim for adjustment itself having been presented should not even be 
possible.
237
 It could, therefore, be argued that the Finnish Supreme Court seems to allow 
rather extensive freedom for arbitral tribunals to ascertain and apply the law within the 
limits of their mandate. 
 
This common position is compatible with case law based on the 1985 UNCITRAL Model 
Law. Courts have e.g. constantly emphasized that the finality of arbitral awards was one of 
the main purposes of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law and the relevant national 
legislation based on it, so that awards should not be set aside easily. Consequently, the 
appropriate standard of review of arbitral awards under article 34 of the 1985 UNCITRAL 
Model Law has e.g. been considered by Canadian courts to be one that sought to preserve 
the autonomy of the arbitral procedure and to minimize judicial intervention
238
. Moreover 
a Court of Appeal in Spain has held expressly that an arbitral tribunal will not exceed its 
mandate if it reclassifies claims by the parties within the scope of the jura novit curia 
principle
239
. Spanish courts have held e.g. that awarding interests on sums in arrears 
notwithstanding the fact that no such interests were claimed would be considered as excess 
of mandate but that arbitral tribunals are allowed to award costs of the proceedings in their 
own motion without exceeding their mandate
240
.  
 
Therefore, it seems that the approach of national courts in different jurisdictions is rather 
comparable in relation to the ground for setting aside an arbitral award based on excess of 
power in situations where the arbitral tribunal has ascertained and applied the law sua 
sponte. In practice, therefore, successful challenges on setting aside arbitral awards on the 
sole ground that an arbitral tribunal has exceeded its mandate for the application of the jura 
novit curia principle are quite rare and difficult to prove. However, as it shall be presented 
below, where arbitral tribunals do decide to ascertain and apply the law sua sponte, they 
must be cautious not to violate the parties’ right to be heard and present their case, as 
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arbitral awards are in practice more easily set aside on the ground of violation of due 
process.   
 
4.3  Duty to Ensure Due Process   
 
It is generally accepted that the essential task of an arbitrator is to come to a reasoned 
decision from an independent perspective after following appropriate due process at all 
procedural stages.
241
 Hence, due process constitutes the necessary legal framework 
qualifying the proceedings as arbitration and classifying the decision as an enforceable title 
of execution.
242
 Taking an active approach in the conduct of arbitral proceedings and 
assessing the applicable substantive law may risk an arbitrator to seem biased in favor or to 
the detriment of a party. The principle of equality is closely tied to the requirement that at 
any stage of the proceedings each party is given an opportunity to present its case, denial 
of which may lead to setting aside an award
243
.  
 
4.3.1 General Features – Applicable Provisions 
 
Article 18 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law provides the fundamental requirements 
expected of an arbitral tribunal for procedural justice, namely that “the parties shall be 
treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting his 
case”. In other words the fundamental requirements include i) equal treatment of the 
parties and ii) full opportunity to present one’s case.244 The ground for setting aside an 
arbitral award on the basis of violation of these fundamental requirements is provided in 
article 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law. An arbitral award may thus be set aside by the court 
if the party making the application furnishes proof that he was inter alia “otherwise unable 
to present his case”. The wording of article 18 of the 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law “full 
opportunity” seems to impose a very broad duty on arbitral tribunals. However, article 
34(2)(a)(ii) is considered to be interpreted in a manner as to prevent parties from abusing it 
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and to resulting to “dilatory tactics”245. In fact, the procedural guarantee in the provision 
has been said to rather include the right to an adequate opportunity to present one’s 
case.
246
  
 
Since the regularity of the arbitration procedure is, as discussed in Chapter 4.1.3, governed 
by national law, reference is normally made to standards of national law. The parties’ right 
to be heard has been said to be a universally or quasi universally recognized principle 
although its application may vary between different legal cultures
247
. The wording of the 
respective provisions under national arbitration laws follow in general the contents of the 
1985 UNCITRAL Model Law.  
 
In France, arbitral tribunals are under a duty to treat the parties equally and to ensure that 
the principle of contradiction (“principe de la contradiction”) is respected under article 
1510 of the French Code of Civil Procedure. Violation of the principle of contradiction 
opens the award for challenge under article 1520(4) of the French Code. In Switzerland, 
the two fundamental requirements of procedural justice are stipulated in article 190(2) of 
the Swiss FPILA, under which an arbitral award may be set aside if the parties’ 
fundamental rights of due process or the parties’ right to equal treatment have been 
violated.  
 
However, some national arbitration laws have construed their respective provisions slightly 
more narrowly. For example, under section 41(1)(4) of the Finnish Arbitration Act the 
court may set an arbitral award aside if the arbitral tribunal has not given a party a 
sufficient opportunity to present his case. Moreover, section 33(1)(a) of the 1996 English 
Arbitration Act provides that arbitral tribunals are under a general duty to act fairly and 
impartially as between the parties, giving each party a reasonable opportunity of putting 
his case and dealing with that of his opponent. Failure to comply with section 33 of the Act 
shall open the award for challenge under section 68(2)(a) of the Act. The restrictive 
wording of the provision appears to go even further since the same qualitative 
requirements of “serious irregularity” and “substantial injustice”, as discussed above in 
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relation to the ground of excess of power in section 68(2)(b) of the Act, apply to the failure 
to comply with section 33 of the Act.  
 
4.3.2 National Standards as the Common Approach 
 
The same restrictive approach as is generally taken in relation to the ground for setting 
aside an arbitral award for excess of mandate, is also considered applicable in relation to 
the ground for setting aside an award for violation of due process. However, as presented 
below, national standards applied by the domestic courts vary.  
 
a) England 
 
Arbitrators in England are required under section 33(1)(a) of the 1996 English Arbitration 
Act to exercise their powers with care so as not to deprive a party of i) a reasonable 
opportunity to put its own case or ii) to respond to its opponent’s case. However, the courts 
have generally approached this issue in favor of arbitrators actively managing their 
arbitration
248
. In ABB AG v. Hochtief Airport
249
 Tomlinson J found that whilst it is not 
necessary for an arbitral tribunal to refer back to the parties each and every legal inference 
which it intends to draw from the primary facts on the issues placed before it, the tribunal 
must give the parties “a fair opportunity to address its arguments on all of the essential 
building blocks in the tribunal’s conclusion”. 
 
Gloster J quoted two judges in her ruling in The Remmar case
250
 before reaching the 
decision that the arbitral tribunal had violated section 33 of the 1996 English Arbitration 
Act on the ground that it had relied on a point of law which the parties had not invoked and 
for which they were not given an opportunity to comment. Ackner LJ discussed an arbitral 
tribunal’s essential functions in The Vimeira case 251  and stated that “if an arbitrator 
considers that the parties or their experts have missed the real point in the issues the parties 
have raised to be resolved by the arbitrator, then the arbitrator is obliged, in common 
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fairness or as a matter of natural justice, to put the point to them so that they have an 
opportunity of dealing with it”. Moreover, as noted by Bingham LJ in Zermat Holdings SA 
v. Nu Life Upholstery Repairs Ltd
252
 “if an arbitrator is impressed by a point that has never 
been raised by either side then it is his duty to put it to them so that they have an 
opportunity to comment”. In addition, if the arbitrator is in any extent relying on his own 
personal experience, then he should mention about it so that it can be explored. Bingham 
LJ went on to note that a party should not learn of adverse points for the first time in a 
decision against him, as this is contrary both “to the substance of justice and to its 
appearance”. Gloster J emphasized that these principles apply to unargued points of law in 
addition to unargued questions of fact.
253
 
 
In accordance with the general restrictive approach taken in relation to section 68 of the 
1996 English Arbitration Act, the procedural irregularity in question must also be “serious” 
and have caused “substantial injustice” to the claiming party in order for the claim to be 
able to succeed before English courts. Gloster J found the irregularity in The Remmar case
  
to have been clearly serious due to the fact that the claimant had been successful on each 
and every other issue and would have won substantial damages were it not for the sua 
sponte finding of the arbitral tribunal
254
.  
 
Colman J emphasized in Vee Networks Ltd. v. Econet Wireless International Ltd
255
 that the 
assessment of “substantial injustice” will not depend on the arbitrator having come to the 
“wrong” conclusion as a matter of law or fact but “whether he was caused by adopting 
inappropriate means to reach one conclusion whereas had he adopted appropriate means he 
might have reached another conclusion favorable to the applicant. Thus, where there has 
been an irregularity of procedure, it is enough if it is shown that it caused the arbitrator to 
reach a conclusion unfavorable to the applicant which, but for the irregularity, he might 
well never have reached, provided always that the opposite conclusion is at least 
reasonably arguable”.  
 
Although this assessment is merely of a general nature, it could be interpreted as setting 
the threshold quite low. In practice any losing party in the underlying arbitral proceedings 
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could arguably have no serious difficulty in proving that the irregularity, i.e. the sua sponte 
ascertainment and application of the law, caused the arbitral tribunal to reach the 
unfavorable conclusion.  
 
However, it is questionable whether the appropriate threshold for an invalidity ground 
under section 68 of the English Arbitration Act, taking particularly into account the 
express qualitative requirements provided in the said section, should be set so low 
especially since the courts favor the approach of interfering with the validity of arbitral 
awards merely in exceptional circumstances where “something has gone so wrong that 
justice calls out for the matter to be corrected” as stated by Tuckey J in Egmatra AG v. 
Marco Trading
256
. Moreover, it has been argued that a tribunal would have to act 
completely unfairly before the court would set aside an award. Hence, even if the applicant 
in The Remmar case succeeded in showing that not being given a reasonable opportunity to 
make submissions was a “serious irregularity”, it has been argued that it is a difficult 
argument for a party to succeed on since English courts will support arbitral tribunals in 
e.g. enforcing timetable.
257
  
 
b) Finland  
 
The Finnish Supreme Court has had the opportunity to assess the scope of “sufficient 
opportunity” criteria of the right to be heard in accordance with the Finnish Arbitration Act 
in the so-called Werfen case of 2008
258
. The underlying dispute concerned an arbitral 
award in which the arbitral tribunal had applied on its own initiative a Finnish law 
provision regarding adjustment of contracts which had not been invoked by either party 
during the arbitral proceedings. The award was challenged inter alia on the ground that the 
party had been deprived of the right to plead its case following section 41(1)(4) of the 
Finnish Arbitration Act.  
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The Supreme Court found that the respondent had been given sufficient opportunity to 
plead its case in the arbitral proceedings. The claimant had alleged that the contract term 
denying the claimant a right to termination indemnity was null and void on the basis of 
principles regarding commercial agents. The claimant had claimed indemnity on the basis 
of facts which typically may lead to the adjustment of an agreement and, consequently, the 
respondent had had the opportunity to plead its case relating to all these facts and had also 
referred to views on reasonableness when contesting the claim for indemnity. Hence, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the arbitral tribunal had not breached the principle of 
contradiction.
259
  
 
The Supreme Court seems to have considered foreseeability as a determining factor in the 
assessment of the alleged violation of due process. The Supreme Court found that since, 
during the arbitral proceedings, the parties had referred to reasonableness when contesting 
the claim for indemnity, although in a somewhat different context, the application of the 
adjustment provision to a contractual term that was claimed to be null and void could not 
have come as a surprise to the parties.  
 
Moreover, the fundamental nature of the applied legal provision may also have had an 
effect on the judgment of the Supreme Court. The provision that the arbitral tribunal 
applied sua sponte is a fundamental element in Finnish contract law. Knuts has suggested 
that this may indeed have influenced the view of the Supreme Court in finding that the 
application of the provision on adjustment of contracts was foreseeable.
260
    
 
c) France 
 
The French interpretation of the principle of due process (“principe de la contradiction”) 
goes beyond the mere opportunity of a party to present its case. Arbitrators are under a 
duty to ensure that each party will be heard on any point of law or on facts in addition to 
having the obligation to ensure that the parties have had the opportunity to consider and 
comment on each legal and factual issue considered in the arbitral award. Therefore, the 
parties must be heard and be given an opportunity to comment on any new arguments and 
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evidence introduced in the award that were not invoked during the arbitral proceedings or 
in the parties’ submissions.261  
 
The position of the French courts was described in Thyssen Stahlunion v. Meeaden
262
 
where the Paris Court of Appeal set aside part of an arbitral award on the basis that the 
arbitral tribunal had decided on its own initiative that interest would accrue on the 
principal award of damages at the “one-year LIBOR rate” without having heard the parties 
on the issue. The Court of Appeal found that “the principle of due process implies that the 
arbitral tribunal cannot introduce any new legal or factual issue without inviting the parties 
to comment on it”. 
 
The position was confirmed in VRV v. Pharmachim
263
 where the Paris Court of Appeal, 
however, assessed also the possibility of an arbitral tribunal merely requalifying a legal 
instrument within the limit of the factual evidence as presented by the parties without 
violating the principle of contradiction. The Court of Appeal held that “by holding without 
the possibility of an appeal, on the basis of all elements of fact and law that had been 
argued by the parties, that the contract characterized as a sales contract by its drafters was 
in reality a business contract, the arbitrators who only reinstated the legal instrument to its 
exact characterization, as was their duty, in order to apply it to the rules of law deriving 
from the characterization, did not violate the principle of contraction or the rights of the 
claimant by abstaining from inviting it to explain itself regarding a question of which all 
the facets had been discussed”. However, the Court of Appeal partially annulled the award 
on the basis that the arbitrators had, on the other hand, violated the principle of 
contradiction by having modified the legal ground of the claim of damages from 
contractual to tortious liability without having invited the parties to take a position on the 
said issue.
264
   
 
French courts will not set aside an arbitral award on the ground of violation of due process 
only where the rule relied upon by the arbitral tribunal is so general in nature that it must 
have been implicitly included in the pleadings that the arbitrators can dispense with the 
need to call for a specific discussion on that point. Gaillard and Savage have provided 
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some examples of these types of situations by stating that this will be the case e.g. of the 
principle of good faith in the performance of contracts which will necessarily be among the 
elements taken into account by arbitrators who have been instructed to apply French law. 
In addition, the principle that contracts should be interpreted in accordance with their spirit 
is a fundamental rule of interpretation of contracts under French law which will always be 
applied by arbitrators, either implicitly or expressly.
265
  
 
Insofar as the rule relied upon by the arbitral tribunal does not fall within the scope of the 
above-mentioned exception, French courts seem to have adopted a consistent position of 
enforcing the principle of contradiction. This rather strict approach has been upheld in 
recent case law as well
266
. In Engel Austria GmbH v. Don Trade and Others of 3 
December 2009, the Paris Court of Appeal annulled the arbitral award on the basis that the 
arbitral tribunal had violated the principle of contradiction in rendering its decision based 
on a point of law introduced ex officio without inviting the parties to present their 
observations prior to rendering its award.
267
  
 
In the quite recent case of Overseas Mining Investments Ltd v. Commercial Carribean 
Niquel S.A.
268
 the French cour de casssation upheld the annulment
269
 of an UNCITRAL 
award, finding that the arbitral tribunal had in fact modified the legal basis of the 
indemnification by substituting the claim based on loss of profit by an indemnification 
based on loss of chance and, therefore, had violated the principle of contradiction in failing 
to invite the parties to comment on the said modification.  
 
All in all, French courts seem to have undertaken a consistent approach in setting aside 
arbitral awards in which the decision has been based on a point of law not invoked by the 
parties during the arbitral proceedings and not submitted for the parties to comment before 
making the decision. They seem to have adopted the view that any matter of law which has 
not been discussed during the arbitral proceedings will generally be considered 
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unforeseeable no matter what the surrounding circumstances of the specific case may have 
been.   
 
d) Switzerland 
 
The term “parties’ right to be heard” under article 190(2) of the Swiss FPILA refers to 
fundamental due process rights.
270
 The purpose of article 190(2) of the Swiss FPILA is to 
avoid adjudication of claims on which a party had no opportunity to present its case and to 
guarantee each party’s right to have its claims addressed by the arbitral tribunal.271 The 
Swiss Federal Tribunal has established that the parties’ right to be heard corresponds 
broadly with the right guaranteed under article 29(2) of the Swiss Federal Constitution.
272
 
It has been interpreted as including i) the right to examine the files that will constitute the 
basis of the arbitral award, ii) to present legal arguments, iii) to express their opinion on 
any facts that are essential for the decision, iv) to participate in the hearings personally or 
via representation, v) to offer relevant evidence, and vi) to comment on the results of the 
taking of evidence
273
.  
 
However, the Federal Tribunal has adopted a very restrictive approach in interpreting this 
ground for setting aside an award. For example, the parties’ right to be heard does not 
entail a right to a reasoned award.
274
 The arbitral tribunal is not compelled to discuss all 
arguments invoked by the parties and may thus e.g. implicitly reject arguments that are 
objectively irrelevant.
275
 Moreover, the Federal Tribunal has also held that a party must 
object immediately if it considers that its right to be heard has been breached in order to 
give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to correct the situation, otherwise the right to 
complain at a later stage will be considered as having been waived.
276
  
 
The Federal Tribunal has held that arbitrators are under an obligation to apply the law sua 
sponte. Consequently, an arbitral tribunal may base its award on legal grounds not invoked 
by the parties during the arbitration procedure. However, the arbitral tribunal may not take 
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the parties by surprise by applying legal provisions or principles that neither party could 
reasonably have anticipated. If the arbitral tribunal considers that the parties have entirely 
overlooked legal issues that are determining for the outcome of the case, it must point this 
out to the parties and provide them with an opportunity to present their case on the 
issues.
277
  
 
Nevertheless, the Federal Tribunal applies this exception restrictively. The Federal 
Tribunal has held that case law reserves an exception to the jura novit curia rule if the 
arbitral tribunal intends to base its decision on a legal provision or argument not raised 
previously in the proceedings and on which none of the parties has relied and could 
possibly conceive its relevance in the case at hand
278
. Hence, the arbitral tribunal is duty-
bound to inform the parties and grant them the right to be heard only in situations where it 
intends to rely on a fact or a legal argument that the parties have discussed merely 
marginally, or not at all, and none of them can reasonably expect that the arbitrators would 
consider the argument to be decisive for the outcome of the case.
279
 
 
The question of whether something is foreseeable or not is subject to a case-by-case 
appreciation. The notion of what is considered as “reasonable to anticipate” was discussed 
in Urquijo Goitia v. da Silva Muñiz
280
 in which the Federal Tribunal annulled an award on 
the ground that the arbitral tribunal had based its decision on a legislative provision which 
the court found to be “manifestly non-applicable” to the circumstances of the arbitration 
and, therefore, could not have been anticipated by the parties. In doing so, the arbitral 
tribunal had deprived the claimant of its right to be heard. Knuts has also noted that the 
legislative provision in question was not fundamental in its nature, which may also have 
had an effect on the foreseeability of its sua sponte application
281
.   
 
Moreover, the Federal Tribunal has noted that one has to be rather strict in the field of 
international arbitration in order to do justice to its particularities (i.e. intention of the 
parties to let arbitrators, instead of courts of law, to decide on their disputes and 
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cooperation of arbitrators of different legal cultures). The Federal Tribunal noted in the 
case Bank Saint Petersburg PLC v. ATA Insaat Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd.
282
, that a restrictive 
approach is necessary in order to avoid that the purported unforeseeability of the arbitral 
tribunal’s legal reasoning is capable of being used to force on the state court a review of 
the merits of the arbitral award.
283
   
 
In addition, the Federal Tribunal seems, in deciding on the applicable threshold on a case-
by-case basis, to take into account the actual circumstances of the parties’ representation 
and the level of expertise of counsel and any experts heard during the arbitral proceedings 
as it did in the case of Y v. Z
284
 where the Federal Tribunal discussed the view that it was 
not convinced that the sua sponte application of the legal principle in the case came as a 
surprise to the claimant, inter alia because both parties’ representation was comprised of 
expert counsels who had in addition acquired expert evidence on matters of law from 
professors of law
285
.  
 
4.3.3 Lack of Common Approaches 
 
Although the approaches taken by the courts in the presented jurisdictions vary 
considerably, some general remarks are capable of being made. Indeed, the question as to 
how due process is to be applied in practice when new facts and new arguments keep 
emerging in the hearings and submissions, seems to be a difficult task to master
286
. 
 
a) Varying Approaches of National Courts 
 
The strictest approach appears to have been taken by the French courts. In France, the 
situation seems to be that arbitrators in practice are better off submitting all matters of law 
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used as a legal basis in the arbitral award and that were not invoked by the parties to the 
discussion of the disputing parties, or else the arbitral tribunal will quite easily be 
considered having violated the principle of contradiction and the award will be set aside. 
The wording used by the French courts in describing the matters of law which must be 
rendered for the parties to comment and argue are quite vague, which can be seen as 
constituting, by corollary, a rather extended application of due process in France. For 
example, in Thyssen Stahlunion v. Meeaden
287
 the Paris Court of Appeal stated that 
anything used as basis for the decision must be rendered to the discussion of the disputing 
parties.  
 
The English courts seem to have originally adopted a similar approach with the use of 
rather vague words describing the matters which the parties must be granted opportunity to 
comment and present their case, such as “the real point”288 and “point that has never been 
raised”289. However, recent case law seems to have adopted a slightly higher standard. In 
ABB AG v. Hochtief Airport
290
 Tomlinson J introduced a more restrictive standard in obiter 
dicta by finding that in the case, the claimant had been granted a “fair opportunity” to 
address its arguments on all of the “essential building blocks” in the arbitral tribunal’s 
conclusions and that because he saw no further argument which the claimant could have 
deployed which would have been in substance different from the arguments already 
deployed, no “substantial injustice” had been caused to the claimant291. A higher threshold 
was also applied in The Remmar case
292
. 
 
It should be noted, however, that Colman J stated in Pacol v. Rossakhar
293
 that particularly 
in arbitrations which are conducted on documents alone arbitrators should not introduce 
inter alia “matters which have never been matters in issue between the parties” in their 
awards. Hence, in so-called paper arbitrations arbitrators should avoid arriving at a 
conclusion which may not have been envisaged by either party. It seems possible to argue 
that the ground for setting aside an award could, therefore, have a lower threshold in so-
called paper arbitrations.  
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The most lenient approaches towards the respect of the parties’ right to be heard and 
present their case seem to have been adopted by the remaining jurisdictions, Switzerland 
and Finland. There are similarities between the case law of the two mentioned states. The 
Swiss Federal Tribunal applies generally a high threshold to any allegation that the 
arbitrators took the parties by surprise since arbitrators are, like judges, in principle free to 
apply the law
294
. A similar starting point was taken by the Finnish Supreme Court in the 
Werfen case where it found that the principle of due process was not violated since the 
parties were given the opportunity to plead their case as regards all of the facts that were 
applied in relation to the new legal basis introduced sua sponte by the arbitral tribunal.  
 
b) Detectable Common Features 
 
On a more detailed examination of the presented cases it appears, as pointed out by Knuts, 
that most jurisdictions seem to give importance to the fundamental nature of the legal 
concept or principle applied by the arbitral tribunal of its own initiative.
295
 For example, 
the only exception to the strict application of the principle of contradiction by French 
courts relates to situations where the rule relied upon by the arbitral tribunal of its own 
initiative is so general and fundamental in nature that it must have been implicitly included 
in the pleadings that the arbitrators can dispense with the need to call for a specific 
discussion on that point.
296
 Similarly, e.g. the provision applied sua sponte by the 
arbitrators in the Werfen case concerned a fundamental element in Finnish contract law, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
 
Moreover, it has been noted that some courts have shown a certain tendency of interpreting 
the possibility of the disputing parties having expressly chosen the applicable substantive 
law as entailing, by corollary, an acceptance of the fundamental concepts inherent to that 
specific law. Consequently, in these circumstances the applicable fundamental concepts 
may not, in practice, come as a surprise to the parties.
 297
 This observation is supported by 
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e.g. the Finnish Werfen case and the Swiss case X. SA v. Y. SA
298
 where the parties had 
expressly chosen the applicable substantive law. By contrast in the Swiss case Urquijo 
Goitia v. da Silva Muñiz
299
, where the Federal Tribunal set the award aside for violation of 
due process, the parties had not expressly chosen any applicable substantive law
300
.  
 
In addition, courts seem to be generally ready to give some importance to the level of 
expertise of both counsel of the disputing parties and possible expert witnesses that have 
been heard on the applicable substantive law during the arbitral proceedings, as in the 
Swiss case of Y v. Z
301
. Moreover, the circumstances relating to the level of the parties’ 
expertise of the applicable substantive law were also discussed in the The Remmar case 
where the sellers’ legal team did not include English lawyers and so the buyers’ legal team 
was likely to have been more familiar with English legal concepts than the sellers’ legal 
team
302
. By contrast for example in the Werfen case both parties’ counsel were familiar 
with the applicable substantive law, i.e. Finnish law.  
 
Another feature being capable of having an influence on the outcome of the courts’ 
assessment is the concept of fairness. For example, if the provision applied by the arbitral 
tribunal has in fact been “manifestly inapplicable”, as it was the case in Urquijo Goitia v. 
da Silva Muñiz, then the courts may also find more easily that had the parties been given 
an opportunity to present their arguments on the said provision, the provision would not 
have been most likely relied upon by the arbitral tribunal in its award.
303
  
 
All in all, the assessment of what elements affect the foreseeability of the disputing parties 
is significantly dependent on the circumstances of the dispute and the circumstances 
surrounding the arbitral proceedings inter alia. Arbitrators have been described as being 
faced with a “Scylla and Charybdis dilemma” because of the fact that their involvement in 
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the arbitral proceedings and the parties’ presentation of their case must not to be too active 
nor too passive
304
. Striking the perfect balance is an issue to be determined on a case-by-
case basis taking into account all circumstances relating to the parties, the dispute and the 
arbitral proceedings. Some authors suggest that drawing a clear line between what is to be 
considered as acceptable and inacceptable involvement in the introduction of evidence of 
law on the part of the arbitral tribunal does not even seem possible
305
.  
 
Hence, the actual limits of the jura novit curia principle seem to be established in practice 
by the attitudes of national courts in relation to the enforcement of the fundamental 
principle of due process. These attitudes do, however, vary considerably between the 
courts of the examined jurisdictions and the conducted assessment must be concluded as 
being highly dependent on the circumstances of each particular case.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
 
This Master’s Thesis has contributed to the assessment of the applicability of the jura novit 
curia principle within international commercial arbitration by defining the legal basis of 
the principle and by gathering diverging arguments of legal authors and arbitration 
practitioners, in addition to examining the case law in some of the so-called major 
arbitration places in Europe, in order to detect existing common features setting the bounds 
for the jura novit curia principle in international commercial arbitration. The topic of this 
thesis involves a very complex combination of different legal principles and concepts 
relating to the specific characteristics of international commercial arbitration as well as a 
lack of a uniform approach mainly due to the diverging attitudes and backgrounds of legal 
authors and arbitration practitioners. As presented in Chapter 2, the legal background of 
the jura novit curia principle involves a rather delicate balance between inter alia the 
principle of party autonomy, inherent to the consensual nature of commercial arbitration, 
and the procedural freedom of an arbitral tribunal arising from its substantial case 
management powers. Although the number of applicable arbitration laws and rules 
affecting international commercial arbitration is immense, actual guidance on how an 
arbitral tribunal ought to conduct arbitral proceedings is very limited.  
 
The scarcity of detailed guidance has encouraged some authors to consider analogy from 
court proceedings as an appropriate legal basis for the application of the jura novit curia 
principle in international commercial arbitration. This approach highlights the differences 
between the common law and civil law systems which, however, in reality are not 
necessarily essential in the context of arbitration. Moreover, the fundamental differences 
between civil and arbitral proceedings, as examined in Chapter 2.3, strongly indicate 
towards a limited effect of the analogy in the assessment of international arbitrators’ 
powers and duties as regards the conduct of commercial arbitral proceedings and more 
specifically ascertaining and applying the substantive law sua sponte.  
 
Thus, the reality of the lack of guidance has strongly contributed to the ambiguity of the 
current situation. The existing legal literature dealing with the effect of the jura novit curia 
principle in international commercial arbitration is, as examined in Chapter 3, 
characterized by a consistent lack of consensus. Moreover, no uniform approach has been 
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developed in practice either. The opinions of legal authors and arbitration practitioners 
may be roughly divided into four groups including those who argue against the application 
of the principle and are of the view that arbitral tribunals should adopt a passive approach 
and base its decision merely on the legal and factual arguments invoked by the disputing 
parties during the arbitral proceedings.  
 
Others find that the arbitral tribunal is under a duty to ascertain and apply the applicable 
substantive law in order to conclude a valid arbitral award, which can be considered as the 
main contractual duty of an arbitral tribunal once it has been established and given the task 
of settling the conflict between the disputing parties. However, the third group of opinions 
supports a type of partial duty to ascertain and apply the law mostly regarding merely 
mandatory provisions of the applicable substantive law and consider that as regards non-
mandatory provisions, arbitrators have either merely the authority or no power at all to 
conduct independent research on the applicable substantive law.  
 
However, the detailed examination of the existing rules on the conduct of arbitral tribunals 
in the management of arbitral proceedings conducted in Chapter 3.2 indicates that there 
exists no legally binding restrictions or limits to the authority of arbitrators ascertaining 
and applying the law sua sponte in accordance with the principle of jura novit curia. 
Therefore, it has been concluded that the fourth group of opinions, i.e. those who support 
the authority of arbitral tribunals to ascertain and apply the law sua sponte without 
imposing any positive duty on them to do so, would be the most appropriate view to be 
taken especially with reference to current case law which seems to be characterized by a 
tendency of accepting that in specific circumstances arbitrators are able to apply the proved 
facts of a case to legal matters not invoked by the parties, as presented in Chapter 3.3.  
 
As presented in Chapter 4, national courts have the power to control, on the basis of their 
own national arbitration laws, the validity of arbitral awards rendered within their 
jurisdiction which, by corollary, entails that, assuming that the disputing parties have not 
expressly agreed to restrict the arbitrators’ powers in this respect, national courts set the 
ultimate bounds to the applicability of the jura novit curia principle. Hence, in order to 
define the actual scope of the jura novit curia principle in international commercial 
arbitration, one must necessarily examine the position taken by national courts in existing 
case law. Taking into account the fact that most jurisdictions do not allow the courts to 
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review arbitral awards in the merits, the actual limits to the jura novit curia principle are in 
practice set by the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards on the basis that the arbitral 
tribunal has either exceeded its mandate or violated the fundamental principle of due 
process.  
 
However, as it has been established in Chapter 4.2, the examined decisions of the national 
courts in England, Finland, France and Switzerland are characterized by a common 
reluctance of the national courts to setting aside arbitral awards for excess of mandate. 
Courts seem to allow freedom to arbitrators in recharacterizing the parties’ claims to a 
rather large extent. The common position seems to be that insofar as the originally 
requested relief covers the recharacterization of the claim, the courts will not set aside 
arbitral awards on the basis that the arbitral tribunal has alledgedly exceeded its mandate. 
In practice, therefore, successful challenges on this ground are rare and difficult to attain.  
 
The examination of case law relating to setting aside arbitral awards on the ground of 
violation of the parties’ fundamental rights of due process conducted in Chapter 4.3 reveals 
that the standards applied in the different jurisdiction seem to vary considerably. However, 
certain common features can be detected in the national courts’ approaches.  
 
For instance English courts apply the qualitative requirements of “serious irregularity” and 
“substantial injustice” in the assessment of alleged procedural irregularities in determining 
whether a party has been deprived of its right to a reasonable opportunity to putting its case 
and dealing with that of its opponent. However, no general conclusions can easily be made 
from the existing English case law in order to determine how this assessment is conducted 
in practice. An arbitral award was for example set aside in a situation where the claimant 
had lost its case solely on the legal basis applied sua sponte by the arbitral tribunal without 
having submitted the matter to the parties for their comments. In the said case certain value 
was also given to the fact that the losing party’s legal team did not include any experts of 
the applicable substantive law, as did on the other hand the legal team of the opposing 
party.  
 
The level of expertise of the disputing parties’ legal representation and expert witnesses 
heard during the arbitral proceedings has also been given importance in Swiss case law. 
Moreover, Swiss courts have set aside an arbitral award in a situation where the sua sponte 
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applied legal provision was “manifestly inapplicable” to the circumstances of the case and 
the parties had not been granted an opportunity to be heard before the arbitral tribunal 
rendered its decision. The fact that the arbitral tribunal had applied the legal provision was 
considered unforeseeable and the parties should have been given an opportunity to present 
their arguments before rendering the decision.   
 
Moreover, the fundamental nature of the legal concept or principle applied by the arbitral 
tribunal of its own initiative seems to be taken into account in most of the assessed 
jurisdictions. For example, French courts have adopted a rather strict approach of 
enforcing the principle of contradiction apart from the exceptional situations where the rule 
relied upon by the arbitral tribunal of its own initiative is so general in nature that it must 
have been implicitly included in the pleadings that the arbitrators can dispense with the 
need to call for a specific discussion on that point. In addition, the fact whether the 
applicable substantive law has been expressly stated by the disputing parties or not may 
affect the assessment of the national courts. Parties who have expressly agreed upon the 
applicable substantive law may be interpreted as having accepted, by corollary, the 
fundamental concepts inherent to that specific law.  
 
Thus, the approaches taken by the national courts in the examined jurisdictions do not 
generally indicate any common standards of assessment, apart from the fact that the courts 
assess each matter on a case-by-case basis and that the key element in determining whether 
the principle of due process has been violated or not in a situation where the arbitral 
tribunal applies a legal concept or principle of its own initiative, relates to whether the sua 
sponte application can be considered as being reasonably foreseeable in the particular 
circumstances of that specific case. Therefore, the most important question for arbitral 
tribunals to consider when contemplating to base an arbitral award on a point of law not 
invoked by the parties during the arbitral proceedings without inviting the parties to 
comment on it is whether the application of the legal concept, principle or provision in the 
specific circumstances of the case could be considered reasonably foreseeable.  
 
Hence, there does not seem to exist valid real objections against allowing international 
arbitrators to ascertain and apply the law on their own initiative. Moreover, enabling an 
arbitral tribunal to conduct independent research on the contents of the applicable 
substantive law can be considered necessary from a point of view that this is the most 
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appropriate means of ensuring the parties have an opportunity for their dispute to be settled 
in the correct manner as the decision cannot easily, or necessarily at all, be appealed 
against at a later stage.  
 
However, arbitral tribunals must be cautious when exercising such powers and arbitrators 
are highly recommended to taking into account the fact that anything applied sua sponte 
must not come as a surprise to either disputing party or the arbitral award may risk being 
set aside by the national courts of the place of the arbitration or possibly at a later stage 
where the arbitral award is sought to be enforced in another jurisdiction. Moreover, any 
party relying on the arbitral tribunal to ascertain the contents of the applicable substantive 
law on its own initiative must acknowledge the risk this necessarily entails, as arbitral 
awards are not generally set aside on the grounds that arbitrators have failed to apply the 
law correctly or at all since a review of merits of arbitral awards are in practice extremely 
rare due to the common reluctance shared by national courts in most jurisdictions of 
interfering with the validity of international arbitral awards.  
 
 
  
 
